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	 Frerichs	1	
	The	United	States	in	the	Philippines			 The	Philippine	Islands	were	the	scene	of	the	United	States’	lengthiest	colonial	undertaking.	In	June	1898,	American	soldiers	under	the	overall	command	of	Major	General	Wesley	Merritt	disembarked	in	the	jungles	around	the	archipelago’s	colonial	capital	of	Manila.		The	soldiers,	the	majority	of	whom	were	National	Guardsmen,	were	ostensibly	there	to	support	local	Filipino	rebels	in	their	war	with	Spain.	The	American	naval	and	military	expeditions	to	the	islands	intended	to	seize	Manila	to	use	as	leverage	against	the	Spanish	in	the	pending	peace	negotiations	that	would	end	the	Spanish-American	War.1	However,	instead	of	a	temporary	occupation,	the	American	landings	marked	the	beginning	of	United	States	rule	in	the	Philippines.		In	August	1898,	the	Americans	surprised	their	erstwhile	allies	against	Spain	by	unilaterally	occupying	Manila.	General	Merritt	and	Admiral	Dewey,	the	naval	commander,	cut	a	deal	with	the	Spanish	governor	to	exclude	the	Filipinos	from	capturing	the	city.		In	what	was	essentially	an	armed	surrender,	the	Spanish	agreed	to	provide	token	resistance	as	the	Americans	moved	into	the	colonial	capital.2	Once	American	soldiers	hauled	the	Spanish	yellow	and	red	tricolor	down	from	the	central	plaza,	the	Stars	and	Stripes	would	fly	over	the	city	for	the	next	forty-three	years.	The	United	States	would	be	the	Philippines’	colonial	master	until	that	nation	achieved	independence	in	1946.	
																																																								1	David	Sibley,	A	War	of	Frontier	and	Empire:	the	Philippine-American	War,	1899-1902	(New	York:	Hill	and	Wang,	2008),	49,50.	2	Brian	Linn,	The	Philippine	War	1899-1902	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2000),	150-160.	
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United	States	rule	in	the	Philippines	began	with	the	conflict	Americans	call	the	Philippine	Insurrection	that	lasted	from	1899	to	1902.		The	war	was	followed	by	a	period	of	American	colonial	hegemony	over	the	islands	until	the	Philippines	achieved	independence	in	the	years	after	the	Second	World	War.	This	paper	will	discuss	the	American	military	government	that	was	in	power	during	the	Philippine	Insurrection.	One	of	its	organizing	principles	was	that	the	United	States	would	not	be	a	permanent	occupant	in	the	Philippines.	This	principle	makes	the	Philippines	unique	among	the	other	1898	conquests;	the	American	government	attempted	to	distance	itself	from	its	new	addition	by	developing	the	concept	of	a	“non-incorporated”	territory	that	kept	the	Philippines	from	becoming	a	full	member	of	the	United	States	and	preserved	the	possibility	of	de-annexation.	The	U.S.	Army	laid	the	foundations	of	the	American	colony	during	the	war	by	creating	a	series	of	local	governments	overseen	by	the	military	and	managed	by	cooperative	Filipinos.	In	order	to	pacify	the	Philippines,	the	Army	designed	these	governments	to	benefit	the	Filipino	elite	or	ilustrado	class	and	divided	the	population	along	both	ethnic	and	socio-economic	lines.	Ultimately	the	American	occupation	would	not	have	functioned	without	a	significant	level	of	Filipino	cooperation.	The	military	government	in	the	Philippines	would	incorporate	high	rates	of	Filipino	participation	in	the	colonial	government	while	balancing	collaboration	with	perceived	military	necessity.	The	Philippine	Insurrection	officially	began	in	February	1899.	Fighting	erupted	after	a	breakdown	in	negotiations	between	the	Americans	and	Filipino	leader	Emilio	Aguinaldo,	who	proclaimed	an	independent	Philippine	Republic	the	
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previous	June.3		The	United	States	fired	the	war’s	first	shots	when	an	American	patrol	killed	a	group	of	Filipino	soldiers	in	a	contested	section	of	Manila’s	suburbs.4	The	Filipinos	responded	with	a	general	attack	on	the	American-occupied	portion	of	Manila.	The	resulting	battle,	known	as	the	Second	Battle	of	Manila,	was	a	decisive	American	victory	against	the	Philippine	Republic.	Over	the	next	several	months,	American	forces	broke	the	Filipino	Regular	Army	in	a	series	of	engagements	in	the	jungles	and	trenches	of	central	Luzon,	the	Philippines’s	largest	island.	General	Frederick	Funston,	then	the	colonel	commanding	the	20th	Kansas	Infantry,	described	the	jungle	fighting	as	a	series	of	“short	and	sharp	struggles“	that	“resembled	as	much	as	anything	some	of	the	confused	scrabbles	that	are	seen	on	the	football	field.”5	This	conventional	fighting	slowly	gave	way	to	guerilla	warfare	as	the	Filipinos	lost	battle	after	battle,	and	their	field	army	dwindled	and	scattered	into	Luzon’s	countryside.	By	early	1900,	all	regular	Filipino	forces	had	been	disbanded	and	the	Americans	believed	that	the	war	was	all	but	won.	However,	fighting	intensified	during	the	first	four	months	of	1900	and	forced	the	United	States	to	reevaluate	its	strategy.	Starting	in	early	1900,	the	U.S.	Army	was	divided	into	over	500	small	garrisons	stationed	in	the	islands’	towns	and	villages.6	From	those	isolated	bases	the	Army	patrolled	the	surrounding	jungle	and	villages	for	Filipino	nationalists.	Fighting																																																									3	Grania	Bolton,	“Military	Negotiation	and	National	Diplomacy:	Insurgent-American	Relations	After	the	Fall	of	Manila,”	Military	Affairs.	vol.	36	(1972):	102.	4	Leon	Wolff,	Little	Brown	Brother:	How	the	United	States	Purchased	and	Pacified	the	Philippine	
Islands	at	the	Century’s	Turn	(Garden	City,	NY:	Doubleday&	Company,	1961),	10.	5	Frederick	Funston,	Memories	of	Two	Wars:	Cuban	and	Philippine	Experiences	(New	York:	Charles	Scribner’s	Sons,	1911),	198.	6	Office	of	the	Inspector	General	to	Major	General	Adna	Chaffee,	June	30,	1902,	Annual	Report	of	
Major	General	Adna	R.	Chaffee,	United	States	Army,	Commanding	the	Division	of	the	Philippines	vol.	1,	(Manila:	The	Department	of	the	Pacific,	1902),	2.	
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consisted	of	ambushes	and	patrols	as	each	side	attempted	to	win	the	support	of	the	local	population.	Historians	have	drawn	two	major	themes	from	both	the	war	and	the	initial	American	occupation	of	the	Philippines.		The	first	theme	historians	discuss	is	the	American	pacification	strategy.	John	Gates,	in	Schoolbooks	and	Krags,	focuses	on	the	infrastructure	and	public	health	initiatives	the	American	military	undertook	as	part	of	their	war	effort.		Gates	describes	early	American	officers	as	“progressives	in	uniform,”	who	modernized	the	Filipino	education	and	heath	system.7		His	work,	published	in	1973,	built	on	previous	American	surveys	of	this	imperial	era	that	glamorize	the	American	expedition	and	largely	ignore	the	negative	aspects	of	the	conflict.	Conversely,	authors	writing	in	the	Vietnam	era	focus	almost	exclusively	on	the	atrocities	committed	during	the	fighting.	Leon	Wolff,	in	Little	Brown	Brother,	claims	that	during	the	war	the	United	States	conducted	a	racially	charged	campaign	of	terror	that	included	waterboarding,	burning	villages	and	crops,	and	establishing	concentration	camps.8	The	concentration	camps	were	particularly	heinous;	famine	created	an	environment	perfect	for	disease	and	between	one	hundred	and	two	hundred	thousand	Filipinos	died	from	starvation	and	the	subsequent	cholera	epidemic.9	Prior	to	the	early	1990s,	there	were	few	books	about	the	Filipino	
																																																								7	John	M.	Gates,	Schoolbooks	and	Krags:	The	United	States	Army	in	the	Philippines,	1898-1902	(Westport,	CN:	Greenwood	Press,	1973),	54.	8	Wolff,	Little	Brown	Brother,	355-360.		9	John	Gates,	“War	Related	Deaths	in	the	Philippines,	1898-1902,”	Pacific	Historical	Review	53,	no	3	(1984):	376.	
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Insurrection	that	did	not	attempt	to	justify	or	condemn	concurrent	American	foreign	policy	in	Asia	or	Latin	America	by	examining	American-Filipino	history.		Brian	Linn,	the	war’s	most	prolific	author,	wrote	a	series	of	books	and	articles	that	provide	a	more	centrist	approach	to	the	conflict.	He	contextualizes	the	scale	of	the	atrocities;	instead	of	being	a	staple	of	the	war,	waterboarding	and	massacres	were	rare	occurrences	but	were	dramatized	in	the	American	and	insurgent	press.10	Linn	acknowledges	that	other	morally	gray	decisions	such	as	the	forcible	concentration	of	Filipino	civilians	into	camps	and	the	systematic	destruction	of	crops,	livestock	and	buildings	were	official	American	policy	beginning	in	late	1900	and	1901.	However,	he	does	downplay	the	scale	of	destruction	and	death	the	camps	caused	the	Philippines.	Linn’s	greatest	contribution	to	the	war’s	historiography	is	to	shift	the	conversation	away	from	what	he	sees	as	a	preoccupation	with	individual	atrocities	and	take	a	wider	approach	to	studying	the	conflict.		Linn’s	main	argument	is	that	at	the	war’s	outbreak	the	United	States	was	unprepared	for	an	intense	conflict	and	had	not	developed	a	political	or	military	strategy	to	win	in	the	Philippines.	The	strategy	the	Army	eventually	adopted,	like	the	nature	of	the	war,	varied	from	region	to	region	depending	on	the	conflict’s	intensity.	11	Any	discussion	of	American	policy	in	the	islands	needs	to	understand	the	conduct	of	the	war	varied	greatly	from	region	to	region.	For	example,	the	American	military	government	on	Luzon	had	a	completely	different	character	than	
																																																								10	Linn,	The	Philippine	War,	158.	11	Brian	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	1899-1902	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1998),	169.	
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the	government	on	Negros,	which	was	in	turn	different	from	American	policy	in	Moros.	The	cause	of	the	variation	is	directly	related	to	American	perceptions	of	Filipino	cooperation	with	the	interim	military	government.	The	second	historiographical	theme	centers	on	the	racial	hierarchy	that	the	United	States	used	to	justify	its	occupation	of	the	islands.		1898	was	the	year	of	Kipling’s	poem	“The	White	Man’s	Burden,”	which	personified	the	belief	that	white	people	had	a	sacred	duty	to	lead	savage,	or	all	non-white	races,	out	of	barbarism	and	into	the	civilized	community.12	The	idea	was	used	to	justify	the	American	occupation	in	the	United	States.	As	one	soldier	wrote	in	his	diary,	“Anyone	at	home	who	believes	[the	Filipinos]	capable	of	governing	themselves	has	only	to	come	out	and	he	will	be	sadly	disillusioned.”13	To	another,	the	Filipinos	were	a	“race	of	men	who…if	guided	right	will	make…valuable	citizens”	of	the	United	States.	14	Paul	Kramer	describes	the	situation	best	in	Blood	of	Government	when	he	writes	“race	was	an	epistemology	suited	to	constructing	the	political	exceptions	that	would	qualify	and	delimit”	colonial	state	structures.15	The	justification	and	basis	of	the	colonial	government	was	rooted	in	American	preconceived	notions	about	the	Filipino	people.	Rhetoric	leading	up	to	the	annexation	romanticized	a	future	imperial	government	with	which	the	United	States	occupied	the	Philippines	not	only	for	material	gain,	but	also	for	the	higher	purpose	of	teaching	the	Filipinos	the	principles																																																									12	Paul	Kramer,	The	Blood	of	Government:	Race,	Empire,	the	United	States	&	the	Philippines	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina,	2006),	13.	13	John	Clifford	Brown,	Gentleman	Soldier:	John	Clifford	Brown	&	the	Philippine-American	War,	ed.	Joseph	McCallus	(College	Station:	Texas	A&M	University	Press,	2004),	94.	14	George	Davis	to	Frank	Baldwin,	May	4,	1902,	SC	Box	1	“Frank	D	Baldwin:	Original	1902	War	Letters”	Swem	Library	Special	Collections,	Williamsburg,	Virginia.	15	Paul	Kramer,	The	Blood	of	Government,	4.	
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of	self-government	through	colonial	rule.	An	1898	editorial	in	the	New	York	Times	described	how	the	American	government	would	“instruct	[the	natives]	in	the	duties	of	freedmen”	during	its	rule,	despite	the	existence	of	Aguinaldo’s	Philippine	Republic.16	American	policy	makers	stated	that	the	Filipinos	were	incapable	of	self-government	to	justify	the	annexation	and	retention	of	the	islands.		Any	discussion	of	American	colonial	state	structure	needs	to	acknowledge	that	one	of	the	stated	purposes	of	American	intervention	in	the	islands	was	to	teach	the	Filipinos	how	to	govern	themselves	along	American	lines.	For	each	Filipino	civil	position,	there	was	an	American	counterpart	ensuring	that	the	Filipino	adhered	to	American	interests	and	perceptions	of	government.		John	Barrett,	the	United	States	Minister	to	Siam	in	1898,	testified	to	Congress	that	“with	high-class	Americans	exercising	a	guiding	and	encouraging	hand	there	is	no	reason	why…the	Filipinos	should	not	attain	all	the	privileges	of	absolute	independence.”17		Barrett	went	on	to	advocate	for	high	levels	of	Filipino	participation	in	the	government.		He	believed	that	giving	the	Filipinos	a	significant	degree	of	autonomy	and	representation	in	the	colonial	government	would	benefit	American	long	term	interests.18	Barrett’s	testimony	to	Congress	is	an	example	of	the	underlying	philosophy	behind	what	would	become	the	American	colonial	state	in	the	Philippines.	Historians	have	thoroughly	picked	over	the	racial	motivations	and	constructs	behind	twentieth-century	imperialism.	There	is	little	doubt	that	conceptions	of	
																																																								16	"Our	Pupils	in	Politics"	New	York	Times	July,	27,	1898,	6.	17	The	Philippine	Information	Society,	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898	together	with	Opinions	on	
the	Questions	are	the	Filipinos	Capable	of	Self-Government?	(Boston:	The	Philippine	Information	Society,	1901),	23.	18	The	Philippine	Information	Society,	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898,	23.	
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racial	superiority	were	a	justification	or	used	to	justify	the	American	annexation	of	the	islands.	Where	this	paper	addresses	race	it	will	discuss	the	nature	of	how	the	United	States	sought	to	exploit	existing	racial	tensions	between	the	various	Filipino	ethnic	groups	in	order	to	facilitate	American	rule.	As	one	retired	general	predicted	in	1898,	the	United	States	would	adopt	a	similar	strategy	to	that	of	the	British	in	India:	divide	the	native	ethnic	groups	and	play	them	against	one	another	to	suppress	revolt	and	manage	the	colonial	government.19	General	Elwell	Otis,	General	Merritt's	replacement	as	overall	commander	in	the	Philippines,	and	his	military	and	civil	peers	believed	that	Aguinaldo’s	government	was	a	Tagalog	entity	and	opposed	by	other	ethnic	groups.20		They	decided	that	because	the	revolution’s	leadership	was	predominantly	Tagalog,	and	because	Aguinaldo	dealt	with	revolts	from	other	ethnicities	on	Luzon,	that	the	push	for	Filipino	independence	was	a	purely	Tagalog	effort.21	Therefore	the	best	strategy	to	undermine	the	Philippine	Republic’s	legitimacy	was	to	set	up	regional	governments	along	ethnic	boundaries.		The	Army	did	this	on	the	island	of	Negros	and	in	the	Muslim	Sultanate	of	Sulu	in	1899,	and	later	in	Central	Luzon	in	1900.	President	McKinley’s	letter	outlining	his	vision	for	American	rule	became	the	Army’s	guide	to	structuring	the	military	government	because	Congress	had		made	no	provisions	for	governing	or	organizing	the	islands.		Per	the	president’s	instructions,	the	Army	kept	many	of	the	laws	and	Filipino	officials	from	the	old	Spanish	regime.	McKinley	ordered	General	Merritt	to	keep	the	Spanish	colonial	state	
																																																								19The	Philippine	Information	Society,	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898,	25.	20	The	Philippine	Information	Society,	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898,	31.	21	The	Philippine	Information	Society,	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898,	32,34.	
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structure	until	the	Army	deemed	existing	Spanish	law	inadequate.22	The	president	gave	the	Army	broad	authority	to	administer	all	the	functions	of	a	colonial	government.	Everything	from	customs	to	taxes,	policing	to	education,	and	criminal	justice	to	civil	marriage	fell	within	the	military’s	jurisdiction.23		However,	the	United	States	lacked	qualified	civilian	officials	to	fill	those	posts.		Thus	the	Army	turned	to	the	National	Guard	and	U.S.	Volunteers	to	administer	the	colonial	government.		Many	of	these	men	held	the	same	post	as	they	had	in	their	civilian	capacity	back	in	the	United	States.	Indeed,	Gates	writes,	“The	great	ability	of	the	officer	corps	was	one	of	the	reasons	for	the	success	in	organizing	and	administering	the	military	government”	in	Manila.24		 The	Army’s	first	attempt	to	organize	some	form	of	local	civil	governance	outside	of	Manila	was	on	the	island	of	Negros	in	the	Visayan	Islands.		In	February	1899	the	Army	issued	General	Order	(G.O.)	no.	30,	1899	series,	which	established	a	remarkably	liberal	military	government	on	Negros.		The	order	allowed	the	Filipinos	to	elect	a	civil	governor	and	advisory	council	that	ultimately	answered	to	the	general	in	charge	of	the	military	district	of	the	Visayan	Islands.		The	Americans	retained	control	of	customs	and	the	postal	service	while	a	combination	of	American	and	Filipinos	officers	were	responsible	for	administering	all	other	internal	affairs.25	By	allowing	Filipinos	to	vote	and	creating	a	Filipino	executive	and	legislative	branch,																																																									22	President	McKinley	to	General	Merritt,	May	19,	1898,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	With	
Spain	Including	the	Insurrection	in	the	Philippine	Islands	and	the	China	Relief	Expedition	April	15,	1898	
to	July	30,	1902.		Vol.	2	(Washington,	D.C.:	United	States	Army,	1993),	169.	23	William	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun:	an	Adventure	in	Imperialism	(New	York:	Books	for	Libraries	Press,	1939),	53-55;	John	Gates,	Schoolbooks	and	Krags,	137;	General	Elwell	Otis	to	General	Henry	Corbin,	December	24,	1899,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	With	Spain,	1125.	24John	Gates,	Schoolbooks	and	Krags,	64	25	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	30”	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	[Issued	from	the	Offices	
of	the	U.S.	Military	Governor	in	the	Philippine	Islands]	1899	(Manila,	1899),	1-5.	
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the	government	structure	on	Negros	followed	the	tutelage	sentiment	while	allowing	the	Americans	to	retain	sufficient	power	to	suppress	the	occasional	revolt.		 That	system	was	supplanted	in	the	rest	of	the	archipelago	when	the	Army	issued	G.O.	43,	1899	series.		G.O.	43,	1899	series,	kept	the	Spanish	provincial	and	municipal	system	with	some	modifications	to	the	legal	system.		G.O.	43’s	implementation	coincided	with	the	outbreak	of	heavy	guerilla	fighting	on	Luzon.		Within	the	year	the	Army	recognized	that	many	aspects	of	its	original	approach	needed	desperate	reform.	As	part	of	the	Army’s	strategic	revaluation	it	overhauled	G.O.	43.		In	1900	G.O.	40,	1900	series,	replaced	the	older	order,	G.O.	43,	as	the	predominant	method	of	organizing	municipal	governments.		 G.O.	40	had	many	of	the	same	aspects	as	G.O.	30,	but	the	Army	did	not	apply	it	uniformly	throughout	the	island	because	of	the	different	conditions	that	existed	between	regions.		The	Army	dispersed	American	units	into	small	garrisons,	which	freed	junior	officers	from	direct	control.		Those	officers	soon	found	that	official	policies	needed	to	be	either	altered	or	abandoned,	and	they	developed	their	own	counterinsurgency	methods	that	reflected	their	perception	of	the	conflict.26		For	example,	between	late	1900	and	1901	there	were	a	number	of	incidents	where	the	town’s	elected	mayor	was	also	the	local	insurgent	commander.	The	Army	countered	this	strategy	by	discarding	G.O.	40	and	implementing	marshal	law	in	the	affected	areas.	Despite	its	inconsistencies,	G.O.	40	maximized	Filipino	participation	in	municipal	governments	during	the	Philippine-American	war.	
																																																								26	Brian	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	169.	
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The	Army	designed	G.O.	40	with	the	ultimate	goal	of	turning	the	island’s	administration	over	to	American	civilian	authorities.	President	McKinley	dispatched	two	commissions,	one	in	1899	and	a	second	in	1900,	to	act	as	a	balance	to	the	military	government.		The	first	commission	only	made	recommendations	about	how	the	island	should	be	managed	before	it	was	recalled	by	Washington.		The	second	commission,	under	the	direction	of	Judge	William	Taft,	ultimately	assumed	control	of	the	colonial	government.		The	commissions	ultimately	incorporated	many	aspects	of	the	military	government	into	civilian	rule.	Civil	governance	was	officially	established	on	July	4,	1900,	but	due	to	the	war,	exercised	little	control	over	the	islands	until	the	Army	began	transferring	towns	to	its	control	in	1901.			However,	in	areas	where	the	insurgent	presence	was	stronger,	the	Army	retained	control	of	the	civilian	population	until	late	1902.		The	most	extreme	cases	of	military	control	occurred	during	the	war’s	last	year	when	General	Franklin	Bell	corralled	Filipino	civilians	into	camps,	where	many	of	them	died	due	to	starvation	and	disease	in	southern	Luzon.			The	Army’s	military	government	during	the	war	was	evolving	and	irregular;	each	region	was	allowed	different	levels	of	freedom	based	on	its	cooperation	with	American	authority.	The	President’s	long-term	strategy	was	to	win	the	support	of	Filipino	political	and	economic	élite	by	incorporating	them	into	the	new	American	system.27	The	American	Empire	controlled	its	Philippine	colony	by	structuring	its	
																																																								27	Daniel	R.	Williams,	The	Odyssey	of	the	Philippine	Commission	(Chicago:	A.C.	McClurg	&	Co.,	1913),	123	
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colonial	government	to	give	limited	franchise	to	the	subject	population.28		In	order	to	achieve	that	goal,	the	Army	created	a	system	where	the	Filipinos	were	responsible	for	the	day-to-day	tasks	of	governing	the	island	under	American	supervision.	The	military	government	in	the	Philippines	was	responsible	for	conquering	the	islands	through	both	political	and	military	measures.		Subjects,	Not	Citizens		Before	the	United	States	could	form	a	colonial	government	in	the	Philippines,	it	had	to	determine	the	islands’	legal	status.	The	process	for	organizing	new	territories,	enshrined	in	the	Northwest	Ordinance	Act	of	1787	established	an	organizational	pattern	for	new	American	territories	as	well	as	a	path	to	statehood.29	However	the	Philippines	were	different	from	previous	territories	because	there	was	little	public	desire	to	allow	the	islands	to	achieve	statehood	in	part	because	Americans	viewed	the	islands	as	American	property	inhabited	by	an	uncivilized	people.30	This	is	different	than	the	western	territories	because	there	was	little	room	for	American	settlers	in	the	islands	to	give	it	a	Caucasian	justification	to	become	a	potential	state.	The	racial	difference	between	Filipinos	and	Americans	was	the	primary	justification	Congress	used	to	circumnavigate	the	Northwest	Ordinance	Act.31	However,	the	American	public’s	unwillingness	to	accept	the	Filipinos	as	potentially	equal	citizens	did	not	answer	the	question	about	the	island’s	legal	status.	
																																																								28	Paul	Hutchcroft		“The	Hazards	of	Jeffersonianism:	Challenges	of	State	Building	in	the	United	States	and	its	Empire,”	in	Colonial	Crucible:	Empire	in	the	Making	of	the	Modern	American	State,	ed.	Alfred	McCoy	and	Francisco	Scarano	(Madison:	University	of	Wisconsin	Press,	2009),	385.	29	Lynch,	“The	U.S.	Constitution	and	Philippine	Colonialism:	An	Enduring	and	Unfortunate	Legacy,”	in	
Colonial	Crucible,	353.	30	W.	Krueger,	“Have	Colonies	Only”	The	New	York	Times,	December,	1,	1898;	45.		31	Lynch,	“The	U.S.	Constitution	and	Philippine	Colonialism,”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	353-356.	
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Progress	along	this	front	was	slow	because	Congress	was	bitterly	divided	between	pro-imperialists	and	anti-imperialists.	The	Treaty	of	Paris,	which	ended	the	war	with	Spain,	passed	the	Senate	by	only	one	vote,	in	part	due	to	the	clause	that	annexed	the	Philippines.32	Anti-imperialists	believed	that	the	Constitution	did	not	allow	the	United	States	to	acquire	territory	without	the	consent	of	the	people	living	in	that	territory	or	providing	some	mechanism	to	citizenship	and	constitutional	protection.	Few	factions	wanted	the	Filipinos	to	become	full	American	citizens,	but	the	anti-imperialists	were	concerned	about	the	precedent	that	annexation	without	full	incorporation	would	entail.33	As	George	Frisbee	Hoar,	the	Republican	senator	from	Massachusetts	stated,	“Under	the	Declaration	of	Independence	you	cannot	govern	a	foreign	territory,	a	foreign	people”	without	giving	them	the	same	protections	enjoyed	by	United	States	citizens.34	Due	to	the	divide,	Congress	was	gridlocked	over	the	potential	consequences	and	legality	of	expanding	into	the	Philippines.	As	a	result	of	the	gridlock,	Congress	passed	only	one	resolution	and	one	amendment	to	address	the	status	of	the	newly	acquired	territories	between	General	Merritt’s	conquest	of	Manila	in	1898	and	the	official	end	of	the	Filipino	insurrection	in	1902.		A	resolution	sponsored	by	Senator	Samuel	D.	McEnery	in	1898	specified	that	Filipinos	would	not	to	have	the	same	legal	status	as	American	citizens.35	McEnery’s	act	built	on	the	1892	Supreme	Court	decision	Ross	v.	United	States.	In	that																																																									32	Stephen	Stathis,	Landmark	Debates	in	Congress:	From	the	Declaration	of	Independence	to	the	War	
with	Iraq	(Washington:	CQ	Press,	2009),	234	33	Kramer,	The	Blood	of	Government,	415;	Congressional	Records,	56th	Congress.,	2nd	Session.,	2977-3600.		34	Congressional	Records,	55th	Congress.,	3rd	Session.,	493.	35	Lynch,	“The	U.S.	Constitution	and	Philippine	Colonialism,”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	356.	
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ruling,	the	court	stated	that	constitutional	rights	and	protections	did	not	extend	beyond	the	borders	of	the	United	States	to	non-American	citizens.36	The	adoption	of	the	McEnery	resolution	was	the	first	step	Congress	took	to	separate	the	new	Pacific	territories	from	the	American	homeland.	However	the	act	still	did	not	answer	the	question	of	what	to	do	with	the	Philippines.	In	the	legislative	vacuum,	the	Supreme	Court	made	the	final	decision	on	the	legal	status	of	the	new	territories	in	a	series	of	decisions	over	tariff	laws	known	as	the	Insular	Cases	of	1901.	In	1899	Congress	levied	a	series	of	tariffs	on	imports	coming	from	Puerto	Rico.	A	number	of	American	corporations	producing	raw	goods	in	Puerto	Rico	challenged	the	tariff’s	constitutionality	on	the	grounds	that	it	violated	the	uniform	duties	clause.37	The	court’s	1901	rulings	upheld	the	constitutionality	of	tariff	restrictions	on	Puerto	Rican	goods	even	though	it	was	now	part	of	the	United	States	in	Downes	v.	Bidwell.38	The	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	implied	that	because	Congress	could	impose	tariff	restrictions	on	the	new	territories,	despite	the	constitutional	requirement	of	uniform	duties,	the	new	territories	were	not	protected	by	the	Constitution.		If	the	territories	were	not	protected	by	the	Constitution	then	they	were	not	protected	by	the	Bill	of	Rights.39	As	a	result	of	the	case,	the	new	possessions	America	acquired	at	end	of	the	Spanish-American	war	were	not	equal	members	of	the	United	States.	
																																																								36	Silbey,	A	War	of	Frontier	and	Empire,	92.	37	Lynch,	“The	U.S.	Constitution	and	Philippine	Colonialism”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	361.	38	Leah	Bruce	and	Paul	Finkelman,	Milestone	Documents	in	American	History:	Exploring	the	Primary	
Sources	that	Shaped	America,	vol.	3	(Dallas:	Salem	Press,	2008),	1130. 39	Lynch,	“The	U.S.	Constitution	and	Philippine	Colonialism,”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	363.	
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The	American	territorial	system	changed	from	nearly	automatic	full	incorporation	to	a	system	where	“civil	rights	are	either	refused,	or	are	doled	out	by	Congress	one	at	a	time.”40	It	was	a	complete	abandonment	of	the	previous	concept	of	ex	proprio	vigore,	which	means	the	constitution	applied	to	territories	through	its	own	force.41	The	people	living	in	them	became	American	subjects,	not	citizens.		That	decision	produced	the	doctrine	of	“non-incorporated”	territories,	which	are	lands	governed	by	the	United	States	but	lack	constitutional	protection.	The	novelty	of	the	decision	is	apparent	in	the	debate	over	the	passage	of	the	Spooner	Amendment	in	1901.		The	Spooner	Amendment	was	the	second	piece	of	legislation	that	Congress	passed	to	fulfill	its	obligations	under	the	Treaty	of	Paris.		The	Spooner	Amendment	did	little	more	than	confirm	the	president’s,	and	by	extension	the	military’s,	control	over	the	executive,	judicial	and	legislative	powers	in	the	Philippines.42	It	passed	over	the	objections	of	the	anti-imperialist	Senators	Teller	and	Allen.	Teller	was	in	shock	that	there	were	no	restrictions	on	the	colonial	government’s	power,	and	that	Congress	was	preparing	to	keep	the	status	quo.43	The	lack	of	congressional	oversight	gave	the	executive	branch	a	large	amount	of	leeway	in	creating	and	enforcing	American	policy	in	the	Philippines.	The	executive	branch	pushed	to	restrict	the	legal	rights	of	the	Philippine	Islands	as	early	as	1898.	In	a	lengthy	and	convoluted	opinion,	the	office	of	the	Secretary	of	War	pointed	out	that	there	was	precedence	for	restricting	the	legal	rights	of	
																																																								40	Sidney	Webster,	“The	New	Philippine	Government”	The	North	American	Review	vol.	175,	no	550	(1902):	303.	41	Leah	Bruce	and	Paul	Finkelman,	Milestone	Documents	in	American	History,	1132.	42	Congressional	Records,	56th	Congress.,	2nd	Session,	3141.	43	Congressional	Records,	56th	Congress.,	2nd	Session,	3140.	
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conquered	territories	until	confirmed	by	Congress.	For	example,	the	executive	department	did	not	extend	constitutional	rights	to	people	living	in	the	Louisiana	Purchase	until	securing	the	requisite	congressional	approval.44	The	executive	brief	built	on	the	precedent	of	the	Treaty	of	Guadalupe-Hidalgo,	which	created	a	naturalization	path	for	former	Mexican	citizens.	The	brief	claimed	that	Congress	was	the	party	responsible	for	extending	those	rights	though	the	ratification	of	the	treaty’s	citizenship	clause.45	Because	neither	the	1898	Treaty	of	Paris	nor	Congress	made	such	a	stipulation,	the	executive	department	determined	the	president	was	responsible	for	setting	policy.	The	executive	branch	used	congressional	inaction	to	allow	itself	unlimited	authority	to	shape	the	Philippine’s	government.		The	executive	branch	decided	that	constitutional	protections	could	not	extend	to	a	new	territory	because	they	only	applied	to	states.	This	decision	meant	that	concepts	enshrined	in	the	Bill	of	Rights,	and	the	rights	to	habeas	corpus,	trial	by	a	jury	of	one’s	peers,	etc.,	did	not	apply	to	the	Philippines	until	Congress	or	the	military	extended	their	reach	to	the	islands.46			McKinley	did	place	some	loose	restrictions	on	military	power.		He	instructed	General	Merritt	to	the	following	end:	“the	inhabitants,	so	long	as	they	perform	their	duties,	are	entitled	to	security	in	their	persons	and	property	and	in	all	their	private	rights	and	relations.”47	That	clause	laid	the	groundwork	to	extend	some	aspects	of	American	civil	liberties	to	the	Philippines,	but	only	after	resistance	ended.																																																									44	Lynch,	“The	U.S.	Constitution	and	Philippine	Colonialism”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	361.	45	Division	of	Insular	Affairs,	Edward,	Charles,	Report	on	the	Legal	Status	of	the	Territory	and	
Inhabitants	of	the	Islands	Acquired	by	the	United	States	During	the	War	with	Spain,	Considered	with	
Reference	to	the	Territorial	Boundaries,	the	Constitution,	and	Laws	of	the	United	States	(Washington,	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	1900),	10.	46	Lynch,	“The	U.S.	Constitution	and	Philippine	Colonialism”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	361.	47	McKinley	to	the	Secretary	of	War,	May,	19,	1898,	Correspondence,169.	
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Conversely,	the	wording	provided	the	Army	legal	justification	to	burn	buildings	and	crops	suspected	of	being	used	by	the	insurgency.	The	loose	interpretation	of	those	instructions	became	a	central	part	of	the	Army’s	pacification	strategy	during	the	height	of	the	guerilla	conflict	in	1900	and	1901.	In	terms	of	structuring	the	colonial	government,	the	president	initially	envisioned	a	centralized	system	that	made	minimal	changes	to	the	existing	Spanish	state.	His	instructions	to	the	Army	read,	“[T]he	municipal	laws	of	the	conquered	territory…are	considered	as	continuing	in	force,	so	far	as	they	are	compatible	with	the	new	order	of	things.”	48	By	keeping	existing	Spanish	law,	McKinley	was	attempting	to	smooth	the	transition	between	Spanish	and	American	rule.	However,	he	also	laid	the	foundation	for	a	colonial	state	along	a	distinctly	Spanish	model	combined	with	some	American	republican	ideals	such	as	representative	government	and	separation	of	powers.	The	ramifications	of	this	decision	are	still	felt	in	the	modern	Philippines,	where	some	historians	believe	that	the	centralized	structure	of	the	Filipino	government	has	its	roots	in	the	Spanish	and	American	colonial	state.49	The	second	half	of	McKinley’s	instructions	built	a	level	of	flexibility	into	the	colonial	system.	The	president	qualified	his	instructions	with	the	passage:		It	will	be	[the	military	governor’s]	duty	to	adopt	measures	of	a	different	kind	if…the	course	of	the	people	should	render	such	measures	indispensable	to	the	maintenance	of	law	and	order.		He	will	then	possess	the	power	to	replace	or	expel	the	native	officials	in	part	or	altogether,	to	substitute	new	courts	of	his	own	institution	for	
																																																								48	McKinley	to	the	Secretary	of	War,	May	19,	1898,	Correspondence,	677.	49	Anna	Leah	Fidelis	T.	Castaneda,	“Spanish	Structure,	American	Theory:	The	Legal	Foundations	of	a	Tropical	New	Deal	in	the	Philippine	Islands,	1898-1935”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	365.	
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those	that	now	exist,	or	to	create	such	supplementary	tribunals	as	may	be	necessary.50		 McKinley	was	giving	the	military	governor	wide	latitude	to	shape	the	new	government.	The	Army	could	pick	and	choose	aspects	of	the	existing	Spanish	colonial	bureaucracy	that	were	most	effective	for	pacifying	the	Filipino	population.	McKinley	did	this	in	part	because	the	United	States	had	no	officials	with	experience	running	a	colonial	government.51	The	United	States	was	flying	blind	into	uncharted	territory,	and	the	president	built	sufficient	room	into	his	order	for	the	Army	to	be	flexible.	The	Army	was	free	to	modify	the	colonial	government	and	apply	different	versions	to	different	theaters	of	operation.		Ultimately,	Washington	gave	the	military	government	very	limited	instructions	on	how	to	handle	its	occupation.	The	debate	over	America’s	role	as	an	imperial	power	and	the	Philippines’	legal	position	further	confused	legislative	attempts	to	exercise	some	form	of	control	over	the	process.	Congressional	inaction	left	the	development	of	the	country’s	largest	colonial	possession	in	the	hands	of	the	executive	branch	and	the	military.	The	lack	of	any	coherent	policy	required	the	different	military	governors	in	power	between	1898	and	1902	to	improvise	an	ad	hoc	government	that	attempted	to	conform	to	President	McKinley’s	vague	instructions.	 The	Colonial	Capital		The	first	test	of	the	Army’s	ability	to	construct	a	colonial	state	was	the	conversion	of	Manila	into	the	new	colonial	capital.		During	the	brief	lull	between	the																																																									50	McKinley	to	the	Secretary	of	War,	May	19,	1898,	Correspondence,	678.	51	Garel	Gunder	&	William	Livezey,	The	Philippines	and	the	United	States	(Norman:	University	of	Oklahoma	Press,	1951),	68.	
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end	of	the	Spanish-American	war	in	August	1898	and	the	outbreak	of	American-Filipino	fighting	in	February	1899	the	Army	embarked	on	its	first	attempts	at	colonial	government.	The	goal	of	the	military	government,	as	stated	by	its	commander,	General	Otis,	was	to	“furnish	full	protection”	to	Filipino	“men	of	property	and	education,”	whose	support	was	necessary	to	sustain	the	military	occupation.	52	Otis	believed	that	if	the	Army	could	protect	the	property	of	wealthy	Filipinos	then	they	would	support	the	regime.		Essentially,	the	Army	saw	its	primary	duty	as	maintaining	public	order	and	protecting	the	wealthy	inhabitants	of	the	city	from	insurgent	activity.		Order	was	the	military’s	primary	concern	in	1898	because	Aguinaldo’s	army	continued	to	surround	Manila	after	the	Americans	took	control.	There	was	a	general	fear	that	any	area	governed	by	or	in	close	proximity	to	the	Filipino	nationalists	would	revert	to	Filipino	control	or	become	destabilized	from	fighting.53	For	example,	the	people	of	Manila	were	initially	dissatisfied	with	American	rule;	food	was	scarce	because	Aguinaldo	levied	an	“export	tax”	on	foodstuffs	entering	the	city,	and	its	inhabitants	had	already	been	forced	to	eat	horses	and	dogs	during	the	American	and	Filipino	siege	of	the	Spanish	garrison.54	A	safe	and	prosperous	Manila	was	an	essential	prop	to	American	legitimacy.	If	the	United	States	could	maintain	order	and	refurbish	the	city	after	the	siege,	then	it	could	prove	to	itself	and	other	western	nations	that	it	was	capable	of	maintaining	a	colony.		
																																																								52	Otis	to	Adjutant-General,	February	20,	1899,	Correspondence,	908.	53	The	Philippine	Information	Society,	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898,	6.	54	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun,	52.		
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To	police	the	city,	the	Army	created	the	position	of	provost	marshal	and	placed	the	city	under	marshal	law	the	day	following	its	capture.	Within	a	week	the	provost	guard	replaced	the	existing	Spanish	police	and	were	responsible	for	preserving	order.	This	would	be	no	easy	task	because	Manila	was	a	melting	pot	for	the	archipelago.	Assuming	he	could	understand	it,	the	American	soldier	could	hear	all	eighty-nine	different	Filipino	dialects	on	the	city	streets	in	addition	to	Mandarin,	Cantonese,	and	a	plethora	of	European	languages.55	The	sheer	number	of	people	and	languages	made	policing	difficult	because	Americans	could	not	identify	people	who	were	foreign	to	the	area	or	quickly	understand	the	nuisances	of	municipal	politics.	The	ability	of	this	police	force	was	soon	tested.	During	the	night	of	February	15,	1899,	soldiers	thwarted	a	Filipino	nationalist	attempt	to	burn	the	city.	Order	was	restored	only	after	the	insurgents	managed	to	destroy	an	estimated	half	million	dollars	of	public	and	private	property.56	The	incident	foreshadowed	the	importance	Filipinos	would	put	on	irregular	warfare,	and	the	equal	importance	the	American	Army	would	put	on	suppressing	their	attempts.	Even	after	Otis	drove	Aguinaldo’s	army	from	the	suburbs,	unrest	in	Manila	continued	to	be	a	concern	for	the	military	government.		When	the	Army	advanced	into	the	surrounding	countryside	after	the	outbreak	of	hostilities,	Otis	was	forced	to	leave	a	“heavy	interior	police	force”	behind	to	preserve	order	and	maintain	the	infrastructure	improvements	it	had	invested	in	during	the	initial	occupation.	57	
																																																								55	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun,	53.	56	Otis	to	the	Adjutant-General,	February,	18,	1899,	Correspondence,	906.	57	Otis	to	the	Adjutant-General,	February	18	1899	in	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	With	Spain,	906.	
	 Frerichs	21	
The	occupation	government	tried	to	win	over	Manila’s	population	by	investing	in	the	city’s	infrastructure.	The	Spanish	neglected	the	maintenance	of	many	municipal	services	in	the	city,	and	essential	services	such	as	sanitation	and	sewer	collection	had	ceased	to	exist	with	the	beginning	of	the	siege.58	Excrement	and	trash	were	piled	so	high	that	when	the	Army	dumped	refuse	into	Manila	harbor	it	would	wash	ashore	with	the	changing	tides.59	The	Army’s	attempts	to	clean	up	the	city	and	other	municipalities	prompted	Gates	to	write	that	the	American	military	occupation	“leads	one	far	from	the	stereotype	of	brutal	repression	into	a	seldom-told	story	of	enlightened	military	government.”60	However,	stable	governance	does	not	necessarily	equate	enlightened	governance;	after	all,	the	United	States	fought	the	Philippine	war	to	colonize	a	foreign	people	who	wanted	independence.	Instead,	what	Gates	terms	“enlightened	military	government”	was	simply	the	implementation	of	infrastructure	and	political	reforms	calculated	to	garner	Filipino	approval	for	American	rule.	The	Army	supplemented	its	infrastructure	projects	with	a	wide-ranging	health	and	public	service	initiatives.	It	restarted	the	Spanish	vaccination	program	and,	partly	out	of	self-interest,	tested	and	issued	cleanliness	certifications	to	prostitutes.61	Their	actions	were	calculated	to	impress	upon	the	Filipino	population	the	benefits	of	American	colonial	rule.	For	example,	the	less	than	egalitarian	ban	on	Chinese	immigration	to	the	islands	was	calculated	to	appeal	to	the	Filipino	working	
																																																								58	Gates,	Schoolbooks	and	Krags.	58-61.	59	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun,	60.	60	Gates,	Schoolbooks	and	Krags,	Viii.	61	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun,	57.	
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class.62	Like	later	policies	on	Negros	and	in	Central	Luzon,	the	ban	on	Chinese	immigration	was	a	calculated	maneuver	to	elevate	one	ethnic	group	at	the	expense	of	another.	Whether	or	not	the	attempts	worked	is	up	for	debate,	but	some	Americans	stated	that	they	did.	One	soldier	wrote	an	article	for	the	New	York	Times	describing	how	the	Filipinos	were	slowly	warming	up	to	the	American	occupation.63	However,	the	difficulty	the	Army	continued	to	have	in	maintaining	peace	demonstrates	that	despite	their	attempts,	the	Philippiens	would	only	enter	the	American	empire	through	force.	The	second	and	more	significant	task	the	Army	undertook	in	Manila	was	the	replacement	of	the	Spanish	state.	Army	officers	replaced	Spanish	judges	and	held	courts	according	to	preexisting	Spanish	laws.	The	city	council	was	dissolved	and	the	military	governor’s	staff	took	up	its	duties	while	Navy	and	Army	officials	assumed	control	of	customs.	Eventually,	custom	duties	accounted	for	20	percent	of	the	revenue	in	the	colonial	administration.	64	The	customs	position	would	become	a	vital	section	of	the	military	administration	because	it	generated	the	most	money	for	the	occupying	government.	Along	with	postmasters,	customs	was	the	only	office	the	Army	barred	Filipinos	from	working	in	because	of	their	importance	to	the	functioning	of	the	American	colonial	state.	The	transition	between	Spanish	and	American	officers	did	not	always	go	smoothly.	To	begin	with,	the	debate	in	the	United	States	over	the	annexation	of	the	Philippines	convinced	some	Spanish	officials	that	they	would	retain	control	of																																																									62	Gates,	Schoolbooks	and	Krags,	58-61.	63	“Filipinos	Becoming	Friendly:	A	Volunteer	Soldier’s	Estimate	of	the	People	of	Manila-They	Are	Learning	to	Like	Americans”	New	York	Times,	November	20,	1898,	14.		64	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun,	53,55.	
	 Frerichs	23	
Manila	after	the	peace	treaty	was	signed.	The	result	was	that	some	Spanish	officers	refused	to	give	their	American	replacements	access	to	documents	and	safes.	In	cases	where	the	Americans	gained	access	to	funds,	they	often	found	that	sizeable	sums	were	missing.	Major	Charles	Whipple,	the	defacto	colonial	treasurer,	discovered	that	the	former	Spanish	governor	had	absconded	with	some	three	million	pesos	from	the	treasury.65		As	the	conflict	wore	on	and	Otis’s	brigadiers	pushed	Aguinaldo’s	field	army	farther	from	Manila,	the	Army	issued	a	series	of	orders	that	document	the	city’s	transformation	into	a	colonial	capital.	In	a	way	foreshadowing	the	outcome	of	the	war,	Manila	was	moving	from	an	embattled	and	contested	city	into	a	stable	seat	of	American	power.	In	early	1900,	General	Otis	issued	an	order	forbidding	American	soldiers	from	being	armed	in	the	city	unless	they	were	part	of	the	provost	guard.	Otis	would	only	have	given	that	order	if	he	believed	the	immediate	threat	of	riots	and	Filipino	infiltrators	was	reduced.66	As	the	threat	receded,	Otis	slowly	moved	back	curfew	in	the	city	from	nine	in	the	evening	to	midnight	over	a	period	of	several	months.67	The	military	relaxed	its	control	over	the	city	as	the	perceived	Filipino	nationalist	threat	diminished.	Manila	was	a	trial	run	for	the	military	colonial	government	and	lessons	the	army	learned	in	late	1898	and	early	1899	would	be	applied	as	American	authority	extended	across	the	island.	The	Schurman	Commission,	a	collection	of	civilians	and	military	officials	tasked	by	President	McKinley	to	provide	recommendations	on	how	
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the	islands	should	be	governed,	generated	a	list	of	recommendations	based	on	their	observations	of	the	Army’s	rule	in	Manila.	The	Commission	found	that	many	leftover	aspects	of	the	Spanish	colonial	state	needed	to	be	reformed.68	Its	recommendations	became	the	terms	of	annexation	the	United	States	offered	Aguinaldo	on	May	5,	1899	and	formed	the	basic	structure	for	civil	government	on	Negros.	The	commission	suggested	that	the	president	appoint	a	governor-general	who	could	appoint	a	mixed	cabinet	split	between	Americans	and	Filipinos.	An	advisory	council	directly	elected	by	the	Filipinos	would	support	the	cabinet	and	governor.69	McKinley	or	the	Army	eventually	adopted	many	of	the	Commission’s	recommendations,	which	included	maintaining	a	military	force	in	conjunction	with	the	gradual	establishment	of	civil	rule.70	The	Army	used	a	modified	version	of	Schurman’s	template	on	central	Luzon	in	1900	and	Negro	later	in	1899.	Negros	and	General	Order	30		The	military	organized	the	first	municipal	government	outside	of	Manila	on	the	island	of	Negros	in	1899.		For	an	occupation	government,	it	gave	the	Filipinos	a	great	degree	of	representation.	Filipinos	on	Negros	accepted	the	implementation	of	an	American	government	with	minor	resistance	because	the	Filipino	government	on	Negros	invited	the	Americans	to	the	island.		
																																																								68	Paul	Hutchcroft,	“Colonial	Masters,	National	Politicos,	and	Provincial	Lords:	Central	Authority	and	Local	Autonomy	in	the	American	Philippines,	1900-1913,”	The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies	59,	(2000):	283.	69Jacob	Schurman	to	Emilo	Aguinaldo,	May	5,	1899,	Manila,	P.I.	SC	Box	1,	“Philippine	Insurrection	Diary	1899-1900,”	Swem	Library	Special	Collections,	Williamsburg,	Virginia.	70Henry	Willis,	Our	Philippine	Problem:	A	Study	of	American	Colonial	Policy	(New	York:	Henry	Holt	and	Company,	1905),	19.	
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The	political	situation	on	Negros	created	favorable	conditions	for	an	American	military	government.	Negros’	ilustrados,	or	wealthy	elite,	rejected	Aguinaldo’s	Philippine	Republic	and	were	fighting	Aguinaldo’s	supporters	from	Luzon.	The	conflict	between	the	Visayans,	the	ethnic	group	on	Negros,	and	the	Tagalog,	the	ethnic	group	on	Luzon,	caused	Negros’	leaders	to	invite	the	Americans	to	intervene	in	the	conflict.		On	February	22,	1899	General	Otis	received	commissioners	from	the	island	requesting	American	protection	from	insurgent	groups	crossing	the	straights	from	Luzon	into	Negros.	71	The	commissioner’s	request	demonstrates	that	not	all	Filipinos	acknowledged	Aguinaldo’s	control	over	the	Archipelago.		Negros’	inhabitants	were	willing	to	make	a	political	alliance	with	the	United	States.	While	the	inhabitants	of	Negros	did	not	want	to	have	their	internal	affairs	directed	by	the	United	States	they	were	willing	to	make	some	concessions	in	exchange	for	protection.	The	government	on	Negros	sent	a	copy	of	their	constitution	to	Congress	for	approval	in	the	hope	that	Congress	would	allow	them	continued	autonomy	in	an	American	protectorate.	72	Their	attempt	to	secure	independence	failed	and	Negros	hosted	the	first	provincial	occupation	government.	On	Cebu,	one	of	Negros’s	sister	islands,	the	Navy	initially	ran	the	civil	administration	in	the	absence	of	Spanish	authorities	and	Army	troops.73	They	did	little	more	than	patrol	the	coast	for	smugglers,	establish	small	bases	in	the	major	towns,	and	appoint	naval	officers	to	oversee	customs	collections.	General	Otis,	in	a																																																									71	General	Otis	to	the	Adjutant-General,	February	21,	1899,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	with	
Spain,	914.	72	“General	Arthur	MacArthur’s	Philippine	Campaigns:	Operations	1899”	RG	Box	20,	Papers	of	Gen.	Arthur	MacArthur	1845-1912,	The	MacArthur	Memorial	Archives	and	Library,	207-208.	73	“General	Arthur	MacArthur’s	Philippine	Campaigns:	Operations	1899,”	Papers	of	Gen.	Arthur	MacArthur,	204.	
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telegram	to	Adjutant-General	Henry	Corbin,	stated	that	affairs	“[on	Negros]	and	in	Cebu	[are]	very	encouraging.”	74		The	small	number	of	soldiers	that	the	Army	needed	to	maintain	order	on	the	two	islands	indicates	that	the	inhabitants	maintained	a	positive,	or	at	least	tolerant,	attitude	toward	the	United	States.	The	natives’	accommodating	disposition	is	the	polar	opposite	with	the	open	warfare	on	Luzon	and	explains	both	the	Army’s	initial	lenient	policy	towards	the	Visayans	as	well	as	the	success	of	those	policies	in	keeping	the	population	firmly	in	the	American	camp	until	late	1901.	Army	policy	was	outlined	in	the	July	22	G.O.	30,	1899	series,	that	organized	Negros	into	a	separate	Army	district	with	its	own	unique	combination	of	civil	and	martial	government.	Interestingly,	the	order	did	not	apply	to	the	rest	of	the	Visayas	islands.	The	Army	does	not	provide	a	reason	for	only	creating	a	regional	government	on	Negros,	and	while	it	may	have	provided	for	the	other	islands	in	a	different	documentation,	it	only	organized	Negros	in	G.O.	30.		However,	given	the	nature	of	the	Army’s	reports	that	emanated	from	the	region	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	assume	that	at	some	point	the	Army	expanded	G.O.	30’s	range	to	the	other	islands,	especially	Cebu	and	Illoco,	where	the	district	of	the	Visayans	had	its	headquarters.	G.O.	30’s	structure	was	intended	to	enfranchise	the	educated,	wealthy	Filipino	
ilustrados.		Upper	class	Filipinos	served	as	the	civil	governor	and	on	the	advisory	council.		The	advisory	council	acted	as	a	kind	of	legislative	body	for	the	island	and	consisted	of	eight	members	elected	by	eligible	voters.		Council	members	were	in	session	for	120	days	out	of	the	year	and	were	allocated	both	a	pension	and	travel																																																									74	General	Otis	to	Adjutant-General,	February	21,	1899,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	with	
Spain,	914.	
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expenses	for	their	troubles.75	The	advisory	council	could	pass	resolutions,	levy	taxes,	and	make	recommendations	to	the	military	governor.	It	lacked	the	legislative	power	of	later	civil	governments,	but	it	was	the	first	American-organized	legislative	body	in	the	Philippines.	The	office	of	the	civil	governor	was	an	elected	position	that	was	more	of	a	figurehead	or	puppet	governor.		His	only	real	duties	were	to	chair	the	advisory	council	and	advise	the	military	governor.		The	civil	governor	also	acted	as	a	rubber	stamp	for	the	military	governor	because	he	countersigned	all	civil	grants	and	commissions.76		This	helped	the	United	States	develop	its	legitimacy	on	the	island.		Although	it	had	no	real	power,	the	office	of	civil	governor	was	a	useful	way	for	the	Americans	to	show	that	they	were	willing	to	integrate	Filipinos	into	the	new	government.	Interestingly,	the	advisory	council	was	allowed	to	levy	taxes	on	themselves	and	spend	that	money	on	infrastructure	improvements.		The	only	revenue	generating	institutions	that	the	Americans	controlled	were	the	customs	and	postal	services.77	There	were	strict	eligibility	requirements	in	order	to	qualify	to	vote.		The	requirements	made	voting	a	privilege	available	only	to	the	ilustrados	and	concentrated	what	power	the	military	delegated	to	the	Filipinos	in	the	hands	of	the	wealthy.	All	voters	had	to	be	twenty-one,	male,	and	able	to	read,	speak	and	write	English,	Spanish,	or	Visayan.78		Tagalog,	Bikol,	and	Visayan	were	the	three	major																																																									75Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	30”	in	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	[Issued	from	the	
Offices	of	the	U.S.	Military	Governor	in	the	Philippine	Islands]	1899	(Manila,	1899),	1-6.	76	“General	Arthur	MacArthur’s	Philippine	Campaigns:	Operations	1899,”	Papers	of	Gen.	Arthur	MacArthur,	208-209.	77	Philippines,	Military	Governor,	Annual	Report	of	MG	Arthur	MacArthur,	US	Volunteers,	Commanding	
Division	of	the	Philippines,	Military	Governor	in	the	Philippine	Islands	Vol.	2.	(Manila:	Department	of	the	Pacific,	1901),	404.	78Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	30”	in	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	1899,	4.	
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languages	in	the	central	Philippine	Islands,	and	Visayan	was	the	prominent	language	on	Negros.	Although	the	language	requirement	would	not	exclude	any	natives	of	Negros,	it	linguistically	and	ethnically	separated	the	civil	government	on	Negros	from	the	rest	of	the	Philippine	archipelago.	Given	that	Negros	asked	for	American	protection	from	insurgents	moving	south	from	Luzon	the	language	barrier	demonstrates	that	the	United	States	sought	to	prevent	a	non-native	Filipino	from	voting	on	Negros.		However,	by	allowing	any	Filipino	who	spoke	Spanish	or	English	to	vote	the	law	enfranchised	the	educated	and	the	bilingual	after	they	met	the	meager	residency	requirements.	The	majority	of	educated	Filipinos	were	bilingual	and	spoke	at	least	Spanish	so	they	had	greater	political	mobility	than	the	peasants	did	not	necessarily	have	the	same	skill.79		The	reading	requirement	further	shrank	the	eligible	pool	and	ensured	that	only	Filipinos	with	an	education	could	vote.	The	second	and	strictest	voter	requirement	was	property.		To	be	eligible	to	vote	a	Filipino	needed	to	own	“500$	worth	of	real	property	or	rent	1,000$	worth	of	real	property.”80		The	order	makes	it	unclear	if	the	property	value	was	counted	in	American	dollars	or	what	the	Americans	called	“Mexican	pesos.”	This	distinction	is	important	because	Americans	considered	American	dollars	worth	considerably	more	than	the	Filipino	currency.	I	am	inclined	to	think	that	the	order	meant	American	dollars	because	the	Army	differentiated	between	Filipino	and	American	currency	in	its	requisition	records.	If	we	assume	that	the	property	requirement	was	measured	in	American	dollars	then	the	voter	pool	on	Negros	would	have	been	exceedingly	small.		By	rooting	the	voter	eligibility	requirements	in	wealth	G.O.	30																																																									79	The	Philippine	Information	Society,	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898,	7.	80	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	30”	in	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	1899,	3.	
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placed	the	power	of	the	occupation	government	in	the	hands	of	the	Filipino	oligarchy.	This	was	part	of	the	United	States’	broader	strategy	to	appeal	to	the	westernized	Filipino	class.	Elite	Filipinos	whose	public	policy	interests	would	be	more	in	line	with	American	interests	were	far	less	of	a	concern	to	American	officials	and	so	were	given	some	representation	in	the	colonial	government.	True	power	on	the	island	was	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	military	governor,	who	wielded	executive	power	over	the	island.	The	first	military	governor	was	Colonel	James	F.	Smith,	who	also	doubled	as	the	commanding	officer	of	the	entire	district	of	the	Visayan	Islands.	81		As	military	governor,	Colonel	Smith	was	responsible	for	appointing	secretaries	for	the	treasury,	interior,	agriculture,	and	education,	and	for	filling	the	offices	of	the	attorney	general	and	provincial	auditor.82	The	military	governor	also	had	veto	power	over	any	laws	the	advisory	council	passed.		The	military	governor	could	delegate	anything	G.O.	30	did	not	explicitly	make	provisions	for	to	the	advisory	council.	The	military	governor	also	could	influence	the	elections	because	he	set	the	time	and	place	for	elections,	registered	voters,	and	maintained	the	eligibility	lists.	Additionally,	customs	duties	were	paid	directly	to	the	military	and	the	military	governor	was	responsible	for	appointing	American	officers	and	collecting	the	taxes.	General	Order	30	also	constructed	the	judicial	system	on	Negros.		The	highest	court	on	the	island	was	a	three-member	court	whose	judges	were	appointed	by	the	military	governor.	The	advisory	council	was	responsible	for	the	creation	of	all	lower	courts,	but	again,	the	advisory	council’s	actions	were	subject	to	the	military																																																									81	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	Annual	Report	of	MG	Arthur	MacArthur,	407.	82	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	30”	in	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	1899,	2.	
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governor’s	approval.	There	was	no	restriction	on	membership	to	the	court.	The	court’s	jurisdiction	did	not	extend	to	affairs	“prejudicial	to	military	administration	and	discipline,”	meaning	that	U.S.	soldiers	were	allowed	to	operate	outside	the	judicial	authority	of	the	local	government.83		This	is	unsurprising	and	is	in	fact	standard	practice	for	any	modern	military	that	occupies	a	foreign	country.	The	court	on	Negros	was	in	turn	subject	to	the	court	in	Manila.		Five	months	after	he	issued	G.O.	30,	General	Otis	centralized	the	judiciary	system	in	the	archipelago.		G.O.	72	series	required	all	military	districts	to	establish	provost	courts	with	“a	suitable	army	officer	as	judge”	by	the	end	of	1899.	The	provost	court	effectively	took	power	away	from	the	native	judiciary	on	Negros	because	its	jurisdiction	covered	criminal	trials	instead	of	the	native	judiciary.	The	native	court	evolved	into	a	civil	court	that	decided	issues	pertaining	directly	to	Filipino-passed	legislation	or	legal	suits	where	the	both	the	plaintiff	and	the	defendant	were	Filipinos.84	Ultimately,	the	provost	court	became	the	more	important	of	the	two	court	systems	to	the	Americans	because	it	enforced	the	Army’s	colonial	policies	and	could	be	convened	in	any	garrison.	The	provost	court’s	versatility	surpassed	that	of	the	native	court	on	Negros,	and	as	a	result	the	cases	important	to	the	colonial	government	were	tried	in	the	provost	court	before	American	judges.	G.O.	30	also	allowed	for	the	creation	of	smaller	municipal	governments	for	Negros’	towns	and	villages.		These	were	designed	to	run	the	island’s	barrios,	towns,	and	cities	with	minimal	interference	from	the	military	governor	on	Negros.	G.O.	30	lacks	the	details	for	how	the	sub-districts	were	to	be	governed	and	so	the	advisory																																																									83	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	30”	in	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	1899,	5.	84	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	72”	in	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	1899.	
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council	was	responsible	for	drafting	their	structure.85	The	advisory	council	most	likely	kept	the	same	organization	and	offices	that	they	had	under	the	Spanish	regime	because	one	of	the	American	requirements	was	that	the	current	elected	officials	in	the	island	would	keep	their	positions	until	the	military	governor	could	organize	elections.86	Keeping	the	same	elected	officials,	and	by	extension	roughly	the	same	structure,	is	another	example	of	how	the	U.S.	military	sought	to	keep	the	native	government	in	the	Philippines	the	same	as	before	the	American	takeover.	The	strategy	echoed	back	to	McKinley’s	instructions	to	minimize	American	interference	in	the	island’s	political	structure.	The	military	government	in	Negros	presided	over	one	of	the	more	peaceful	areas	of	the	American	occupation.	General	Otis	called	their	relations	a	“Marked	and	favorable	contrast”	to	rest	of	the	archipelago.87	The	Army’s	inspector	general	in	the	Philippines,	John	Mallory,	said	“The	situation	in	[Iloilo	and	Negros]	is	highly	satisfactory.		The	insurgents	understand	that	we	do	not	propose	to	attack	them,	but	desire	to	win	their	confidence	and	to	maintain	friendly	relations.”88	The	Army	rewarded	good	behavior	with	increased	commercial	opportunities.		In	July	1899,	the	same	month	the	Army	issued	G.O.	30,	General	Otis	opened	the	ports	on	Samar,	Leyte,	Bohol,	Cebu,	and	Negros	to	international	trade.89		This	was	a	major	step	for	the	residents	because	one	American	counterinsurgency	strategy	was	to	blockade	costal	trade	between	the	islands,	and	reopening	the	ports	created																																																									85	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	30”	in	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	1899,	2-5.	86	“General	Arthur	MacArthur’s	Philippine	Campaigns:	Operations	1899,”	Papers	of	Gen.	Arthur	MacArthur	1848-1912,	208-209.	87	Philippines,	Military	Governor,	Annual	Report	of	MG	Arthur	MacArthur,	43.	88	John	Mallory	to	General	Otis,	January	20,	1899,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	with	Spain,	927.	89	General	Otis	to	the	Adjutant-General,	July	4,	1899,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	with	Spain,	1027	
	 Frerichs	32	
economic	opportunities	on	in	the	Visyans	that	other	regions	lacked.	A	second	indicator	of	increased	economic	stability	and	less	fighting	was	the	record	amount	of	sugar	mills	in	operation.	By	November,	there	were	more	working	mills	on	Negros	than	before	the	1898	rebellion	against	Spain.90	The	relative	stability	on	the	island	created	an	economy	that	was	more	robust	than	the	rest	of	the	archipelago	and	was	an	indication	of	a	smooth	transition	to	American	rule.	A	further	indication	of	American	success	on	the	island	was	the	return	of	the	European	population	to	the	island.	Mallory	remarked	that	there	was	a	“general	exodus	of	Europeans	and	natives	shortly	after	the	arrival”	of	American	soldiers.91	The	exodus	was	an	indication	that	the	American	arrival	may	have	been	met	with	substantial	fighting	or	at	least	skepticism,	despite	the	invitation	of	Negros’	
ilustrados.		Despite	the	expectation	of	violence,	the	Philippine	Republic	was	not	in	a	position	to	wage	a	substantial	campaign	against	the	United	States	on	Negros	in	1899.		Infighting	had	reduced	their	combat	effectiveness	and	General	Otis	observed	that	“insurgent	Tagalog	and	Visayans	in	Pansy	[were]	in	dissension	and	hostilities	between	them	threatened”	to	break	out	on	Negros.92	Between	July	and	January	1899	the	military	government	provided	sufficient	stability	to	facilitate	the	refugee’s	return.	In	the	same	letter,	Mallory	reported	that	once	“confidence	has	been	
																																																								90	General	Otis	to	Adjutant-General,	August	27,	1899,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	with	Spain,	1060.	91	John	Mallory	to	General	Otis,	January	20,	1899,	Correspondence	Relating	to	the	War	with	Spain,	927-928.	92	General	Otis	to	AGWAR,	October	2,	1899,	Correspondence,1077.	
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restored”	both	European	and	Filipino	refugees	returned	to	the	cities	and	the	town’s	shops	and	businesses	reopened.93		The	crowning	triumph	of	the	American	military	government	on	Negros	was	the	election	it	orchestrated	on	November	6	and	7,	1899.94	The	elections	did	not	represent	a	radical	shift	in	native	power	dynamics	but	affirmed	that	the	Army	was	capable	of	organizing	and	implementing	a	government	outside	of	Manila.	The	Filipino	incumbent	lost	the	race	but	instead	of	becoming	a	member	of	the	opposition,	was	made	a	general	in	the	native	army	after	the	election.95	The	new	“president	of	the	Biscayan	Republic”	was	a	Filipino	named	Malisa.	However,	the	American	government	though	he	was	an	untrustworthy	character;	it	was	not	immediately	clear	to	Army	officials	if	Malisa	would	be	fully	supportive	of	the	American	occupation.	Malisa’s	election	in	the	most	pacified	area	of	the	archipelago	demonstrates	that	while	the	United	States	controlled	the	government	it	did	not	have	control	over	election	results.	In	fact,	hostile	officials	would	be	elected	under	the	authority	of	the	military	government	later	in	the	war.	As	I	shall	discuss	later,	the	island	of	Luzon	had	the	biggest	problem	with	insurgent	leaders	or	sympathizers	holding	public	office.	The	dual	nature	of	elected	officials’	loyalty	to	the	Americans	would	be	the	driving	impetus	for	the	arrest	and	torture	of	suspect	Filipinos	later	in	the	conflict.	Malisa’s	election	was	a	symptom	of	wider	conflict	on	the	island.		So	far,	I	have	focused	exclusively	on	the	occupation	government’s	successes.		However,	there	was																																																									93	John	Mallory	to	Otis	January	20,	1899	in	Correspondence,	927.	94	“General	Arthur	MacArthur’s	Philippine	Campaigns:	Operations	1899,”	Papers	of	General	Arthur	MacArthur,	398.	95	John	Mallory	to	Otis	January,	20,	1899	Iloilo	Bay,	Panay	in	Correspondence,	928.	
	 Frerichs	34	
still	measurable	fighting	on	Negros.		While	there	was	no	large-scale	battle	like	on	Luzon,	resistance	to	U.S.	occupation	in	the	region	would	mirror	the	fighting	that	took	place	during	1901	and	1902.	The	majority	of	the	fighting	was	dominated	by	political	assassination	and	small	ambushes	on	American	patrols.		Despite	the	relatively	slow	tempo	of	operations	on	the	island	the	insurgents	were	able	to	keep	the	war	smoldering	underneath	the	veneer	of	success	presented	by	the	U.S.	military	government.		In	June	1899	the	body	of	a	captured	American	officer,	Captain	Tilly,	was	found,	and	Colonel	Smith	decimated	the	insurgents	who	committed	the	crime.	96	Later,	insurrectionists	assassinated	a	“[P]rominent	Filipino,	[who	was]	friendly	to	Americans”	at	Cebu.		Targeting	Filipino	collaborators	would	continue	to	be	a	staple	in	the	insurgency’s	playbook.		This	assassination	coincided	with	a	request	from	the	inhabitants	for	more	American	forces	in	the	islands	but	the	United	States	could	not	garrison	every	town	and	relied	on	friendly	Filipinos	for	help.97	Filipino-on-Filipino	fighting	was	common	during	the	war,	which	in	that	respect	could	arguably	be	labeled	a	Filipino	civil	war.	Filipinos	fought	each	other	as	members	of	pro	and	anti-American	forces	and	at	first	were	divided	along	tribal	lines	in	their	support	of	the	American	regime.	The	presence	of	the	United	States	instigated	much	of	the	violence,	but	Aguinaldo	encountered	resistance	to	his	Republic	of	the	Philippines	on	Luzon	before	the	American’s	arrival.98			In	December	1899	Negros	saw	a	sudden	outbreak	of	skirmishing	between	irregulars	armed	with	bolos,	a	type	of	club	or	knife,	and	the	1st	California	Infantry.		
																																																								96	General	Otis	to	AGWAR,	June	1,	1899,	Correspondence,	999.	97	General	Otis	to	AGWAR,	June	15,	1899,	Correspondence,	1022	98	The	Philippine	Information	Society	The	Insurgent	Government	of	1898,	34.	
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The	outbreak	in	violence	corresponded	with	rumors	of	a	great	American	defeat	on	Luzon.	The	Filipino	nationalists	circulated	false	information	citing	“recent	great	insurgent	victories	in	Luzon	and	Panay”	to	encourage	the	peasant	population	to	rebel	against	the	Americans.	99	The	arrival	of	300	Tagalog	soldiers	from	Luzon	and	the	support	of	two	local	priests	kicked	off	a	series	of	uprisings	and	riots	in	pacified	towns	on	Negros.	100	The	timing	of	the	attacks	reveals	how	tenuous	the	American	position	was	in	the	Philippine	Islands.		The	attacks	occurred	wherever	Filipinos	thought	that	the	Americans	were	losing	the	war	and	were	a	direct	response	to	perceived	American	weakness.	They	demonstrated	that	the	American	strategy	of	co-opting	Filipinos	was	still	new	enough	that	only	the	threat	of	violence	maintained	the	U.S.	colonial	government.	As	long	as	the	United	States	appeared	to	be	winning,	the	majority	of	Filipinos	supported	its	government,	and	Negros	would	remain	relatively	quiet.	 Colonial	Courts		General	Order	43,	1899	series,	established	the	American	colonial	judiciary	system	beyond	Manila	and	Negros.	The	Army	relied	heavily	on	provost	courts,	military	commissions,	and	courts	marshal	to	police	the	newly	occupied	territories	and	to	enforce	existing	Spanish	law.	Military	commissions	and	provost	courts	dealt	with	Filipinos	accused	of	criminal	activity.	Provost	courts	handled	petty	crimes	and	could	impose	lighter	penalties	than	military	commissions,	whose	primary	role	was	to	prosecute	more	serious	Filipino	offenders.	These	were	known	as	“courts	of	first	instance”	and	were	considered	to	be	lower	courts	than	the	high	court	operating	out																																																									99	General	Otis	to	Adjutant-General,	December	8,	1899	Correspondence,	1115-1116	100	General	Otis	to	Adjutant-General,	December	19,	1899	Correspondence,	1123.	
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of	Manila.101	The	courts	marshal	system	handled	both	American	officers	and	former	Filipino	loyalists	accused	of	the	more	serious	military	crimes	such	as	espionage.	The	Army	used	both	civil	and	military	courts	to	regulate	occupied	townships	that	lacked	an	overhead	provincial	structure.	Any	American	garrison	could	convene	provost	courts	and	military	commissions.	The	military	governors	of	the	various	towns	and	districts	were	responsible	for	appointing	a	suitable	army	officer	as	judge	and	as	judge	advocate.	102	For	provost	courts	and	military	commissions,	the	judges	were	junior	officers,	mostly	captains,	assisted	by	a	lieutenant	who	played	the	role	of	judge	advocate	in	provost	courts.	The	minimal	overhead	that	the	Army	required	to	staff	these	courts	allowed	them	to	be	quickly	convened.	The	process	gave	local	commanders	a	degree	of	independence	in	enforcing	colonial	rule.	Instead	of	being	sent	to	regional	headquarters	prisoners	were	dealt	with	in	their	immediate	locals.	The	provost	courts	had	jurisdiction	over	all	“violations	of	military	orders	and	regulations	committed	by	inhabitants	or	temporary	residents	and	not	triable	[sic]	by	courts-martial.”	103	Their	broad	mandate	increased	the	provost	courts’	natural	flexibility	to	punish	petty	crimes.	Provost	courts	could	imprison	people	up	to	one	year	or	fine	them	up	to	one	thousand	Mexican	dollars,	or	any	combination	of	the	two.	104	If	a	Filipino	could	not	pay	a	fine,	then	he	was	subject	to	imprisonment	with	
																																																								101	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	58”	Amendments	to	the	Criminal	Code	of	Procedure	(Manila:	Office	of	the	Military	Governor,	1900),	1.	102Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	72,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1899.	103	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	72,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1899.	104	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	72,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1899.	
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hard	labor	at	the	rate	of	three	pesos	a	day	until	his	fine	was	paid	off.105	The	system	pushed	the	colonial	judicial	process	to	the	Army’s	lowest	organizational	levels,	but	there	was	no	standardized	system	that	replaced	Spanish	law	until	1900.		The	Army	was	constantly	tweaking	its	court	system,	and	a	judicial	hierarchy	developed	among	the	different	military	districts.		Over	time,	the	provost	court	at	Manila	gained	a	large	amount	of	power	compared	to	the	regional	courts.	This	development	was	in	many	was	logical;	as	the	colonial	capital,	Manila	was	directly	administered	by	the	governor	general.	He	therefore	had	a	large	amount	of	control	over	the	findings	of	those	courts	by	appointing	the	military	officers	who	sat	on	them	and	the	chief	judge	advocate	who	reviewed	their	findings.	General	Order	no.	46,	1899	series,	gave	the	Manila	provost	court	the	ability	to	imprison	persons	for	up	to	two	years	with	hard	labor	and	or	impose	a	fine	of	$5,000	or	its	equivalent	in	gold.106		By	comparison,	regional	provost	courts	could	only	imprison	a	defendant	for	one	year	and	levy	a	fine	of	$1,000.		The	Manila	provost	court	was	able	to	inflict	penalties	that	were	twice	as	harsh	as	provincial	courts.	The	strengthening	power	of	the	Manila	judiciary	contributed	to	the	increased	centralization	of	the	judicial	system	by	separating	the	provost	courts	into	higher	and	lower	courts.	Military	commissions	and	the	provost	marshal	could	try	nearly	all	criminal	cases.	Charges	ranged	from	the	ubiquitous	robbery	and	general	lawlessness	to	murder.107	The	consequences	for	these	two	disparate	crimes	were	surprisingly	similar	and	demonstrate	the	seriousness	with	which	the	Army	treated	civil	unrest.																																																										105	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	64,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1899.		106	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	46,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1899.	107	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	67”	General	Orders	and	Circulars:	[Issued	from	the	
Offices	of	the	U.S.	Military	Governor	in	the	Philippine	Islands]	1900-1901	(Manila,	1901).	
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The	unfortunate	Melecenio	Vitug	was	sentenced	to	fifteen	years	hard	labor	for	robbery,	while	Felix	Bautista	was	sentenced	to	twenty	years	of	hard	labor	for	killing	another	Filipino.108	Both	these	men	received	the	maximum	penalty	Spanish	law	allowed.109	Another	Filipino	received	five	years	hard	labor	for	“lurking	as	a	spy”	and	was	held	as	a	prisoner	of	war.	110		The	similarity	of	the	sentences	suggests	that	robbery,	which	threatened	property,	was	nearly	as	heinous	as	the	killing	of	a	non-European.		There	were	no	fewer	than	three	separate	types	of	military	courts	one	could	be	tried	under.	The	military	could	convene	a	courts	marshal,	or	assemble	a	provost	court	or	a	military	commission	to	try	potential	offenders.	The	difference	between	a	military	commission	and	a	provost	court	are	themselves	unclear	and	seem	to	have	been	used	interchangeably.	The	only	consistency	across	the	islands	was	that	only	the	military	could	try	criminal	cases.	Civil	cases	fell	under	the	jurisdiction	of	either	local	Filipino	assemblies	or	American	civilians.111	To	deal	with	the	mess,	the	Army	established	a	supreme	court	in	November	1899	for	the	entire	archipelago	that	consisted	of	both	Filipino	elites	and	military	officers.112		The	Philippine’s	highest	court	was	the	Americanized	descendent	of	the	Spanish	
audenica.	Under	Spanish	authority,	the	audiencia	was	the	highest	colonial	legal	
																																																								108	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	66”	General	Orders	and	Circulars.	109	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	58”	Amendments	to	the	Criminal	Code	of	Procedure,	140.	110Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	69”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900.	111	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	58”	Amendments	to	the	Criminal	Code	of	Procedure,	20;	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	72,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1899.	112	Gates,	Schoolbooks	and	Krags.	130.	
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authority.113		There	is	little	reason	to	suspect	that	the	audiencia’s	powers	changed	during	the	first	year	of	the	American	occupation	because	the	military	kept	most	of	the	existing	Spanish	institutions.		As	it	evolved,	the	Philippine	Supreme	Court’s	staffing	reflected	the	growing	participation	and	influence	of	the	ilustrado	class	in	the	colonial	government.	The	Army	created	G.O.	40,	which	reworked	the	provincial	and	municipal	structure,	with	the	suggestions	of	two	prominent	Filipinos	associated	with	the	old	audencia.114	Both	the	attorney	general,	Don	Florentio	Torres,	and	the	Philippine	Supreme	Court’s	chief	justice,	Don	Cayetano	Arellano,	helped	draft	G.O.	40	and	impacted	the	Philippine’s	long	term	future.115	The	staffing	choice	represented	the	political	tutelage	and	collaboration	models	the	American	press	anticipated	prior	to	the	occupation.	Through	the	Supreme	Court,	Filipinos	participated	in	important	state	functions	under	American	supervision	and	control.	Nevertheless,	the	Filipinos	were	still	subordinate	to	the	military	commanders.	Although	G.O.	64,	1900	series,	authorized	the	establishment	of	civil	courts	in	the	provinces,	those	courts’	findings	could	easily	be	overruled	by	the	military.	Department	commanders	could	overturn	civil,	and	therefore	Filipino	judges’	findings,	or	skip	them	all	together	and	bring	cases	directly	to	military	commissions	or	provost	courts.116	Furthermore,	the	officer	commanding	the	department	in	which	the	trial	took	place	could	overturn	the	findings	of	any	of	the	courts.	For	example,	a	certain	Pedro	Paleis	was	found	“not	guilty”	of	guerilla	warfare	by	a	military	
																																																								113	Encyclopedia	Britannica	Online,	s.v.	“audiencia,”	accessed	February	21,	2016,	http://www.britannica.com/topic/audiencia.	114	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,		“G.O.	18,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900,	2.	115	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,		“G.O.	40,”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900,	1.	116	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	64”General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900.	
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commission	but	the	department	commander	ultimately	overturned	the	committee’s	findings.117	Military	officers’	ability	to	overturn	and	directly	interfere	with	judicial	proceedings	gave	them	an	unsurpassed	amount	of	control	to	interpret	policy	through	judicial	rulings.	They	could,	and	did,	use	their	power	to	arrest	and	imprison	insurgent	leaders	for	petty	crimes.	The	exception	to	the	rule	of	complete	control	was	the	civil	courts	of	Manila.		The	military	could	not	easily	try	criminal	cases	that	fell	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	city’s	civil	courts.	Only	two	officers,	the	provost	marshal	of	Manila	and	the	military	governor	of	the	entire	Philippine	islands,	had	the	authority	to	order	a	military	commission	to	try	cases	that	fell	within	the	city’s	legal	boundaries	after	1900.118	A	combination	of	Filipino	and	Army	judges	staffed	the	Manila	civil	court.	Again,	it	was	part	of	the	American	pacification	strategy	to	appoint	prominent	members	of	the	Filipino	community	to	positions	of	relative	power	in	the	colonial	administration.		The	provost	courts	and	military	commissions	were	not	able	to	try	American	soldiers	for	misconduct.	A	court	marshal	tried	American	soldiers	who	violated	the	laws	of	war.	While	courts	marshal	were	rarely	convened	against	Filipinos,	the	crimes	that	they	tried	reveals	the	different	ways	courts	in	the	islands	treated	soldiers	and	natives.	While	there	is	nothing	unusual	about	a	colonial	power	providing	its	troopers	with	lighter	sentences,	the	findings	of	the	courts	marshal	underscores	the	Army’s	policy.	Take	the	case	of	Captain	George	Brandle	and	Second	Lieutenant	Alvin	Perkins	of	the	27th	United	States	Volunteer	Infantry.	Both	officers	were	from	the	same	unit	and																																																									117	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	67”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900.	118	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	64”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900.	
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stationed	in	the	frontier	town	of	Mariquina	in	Luzon.119	Control	over	small	and	mid-sized	towns	such	as	Mariquan	was	vital	to	the	American	war	effort	because	Filipino	guerillas	drew	the	majority	of	their	supplies	and	support	from	the	rural	villages.		Captain	Brandle	was	the	town’s	garrison	commander,	charged	with	policing	the	surrounding	countryside	and	working	with	the	Filipino	elected	officials.		The	Army	tried	the	two	officers	for	“conduct	[to]	the	prejudice	of	good	order	and	military	discipline,	in	violation	of	the	62nd	Article	of	War.”120	The	two	men	were	convicted	of	“inflicting	mental	anguish	upon”	prisoners	when	they	hung	“a	native…and	five	others	by	the	neck	with	a	rope	for	ten	seconds”	during	the	course	of	an	interrogation.121		Torture	such	as	this	was	precisely	what	the	Army	did	not	want	its	garrison	commanders	doing	because	it	alienated	the	villagers.	The	two	men	were	convicted	and	officially	reprimanded	before	returning	to	duty.	While	it	is	difficult	not	to	focus	solely	on	the	non-punishment	of	U.S.	troops	engaging	in	such	a	horrible	and	potentially	lethal	form	of	torture,	the	words	contained	in	the	official	rebuke	reveal	much	about	the	nature	of	the	U.S.	Army’s	war	effort	and	reechoed	the	racial	justification	for	annexing	the	Philippines.		Penned	by	the	adjutant-general	in	Manila,	the	reprimand	reminded	two	officers	that	their	actions	were	Not	only	criminal…but…calculated	to	defeat	a	carefully	considered	policy,	and	to	inflict	permanent	injury	upon	essential	interests	of	the	Nation.		The	purpose	of	the	United	States	in	these	islands	is	to	introduce	and	plant	republican	institutions,	based	upon	the	beneficent	principles	of	the	Constitution.	Success	in	this	great	endeavor	depends	largely	upon	securing,	
																																																								119	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines	“G.O.	63”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900,	1.	120	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	63”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900,	3.	121	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	63”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900,	5.	
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through	a	sense	of	self-interest	and	gratitude,	the	confidence	and	attachment	of	the	Filipino	people.122		 This	quotation	reveals	the	purpose	of	the	Army’s	policy	toward	the	Filipino	villagers	in	1900.	1900	was	a	pivotal	year	in	the	war	because	it	was	the	first	time	Aguinaldo	officially	adopted	irregular	tactics	and	the	Army	needed	a	coherent	policy	to	counter	the	resurgent	independence	forces.123	The	policy	was	to	create	only	two	perceived	alternatives	for	the	Filipino	people:	destruction	brought	about	by	warfare	between	the	Americans	and	the	Filipino	nationalists	or	relative	peace	under	an	American	occupation	government.	Crimes	such	as	those	committed	by	Captain	Brandle	were	not	punished	because	they	were	adjudged	immoral;	Paul	Kramer	has	successfully	argued	that	many	soldiers	justified	torture	because	they	believed	the	Filipinos	were	racially	inferior.124	The	court	marshal	made	it	clear	that	it	had	punished	the	two	officers	because	they	threatened	the	image	the	Army	was	attempting	to	create.		 An	examination	of	captured	insurgent	document	from	the	island	of	Samar	written	in	1901	by	the	Filipino	general	Lukban	corroborates	the	idea	that	the	rebels	made	American	violence	a	rallying	cry	for	resistance.	In	a	proclamation	to	his	supporters,	Lukban	extorts	his	fellow	Filipinos	to	“see	the	great	abuses,	the	amazing	acts	committed	by	the	enemy	in	the	towns	he	has	entered,”	which	included	“outraging	young	girls,	sacking	houses…and	perpetrating	other	abuses	which	no	
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history	of	warfare	records.”125	Lukban’s	efforts	had	some	effect	on	the	people	of	Bohol	and	Cebu.	These	regions	were	considered	pacified	in	1899	but	under	Lukban’s	leadership	they	belatedly	supported	the	Filipino	independence	movement	until	1902.	Public	opinion,	both	in	the	Philippines	and	in	the	United	States,	was	essential	to	both	sides	for	continuing	the	war.	In	Luzon,	Filipino	nationalists	mistreated	a	collection	of	villages	in	Bataan,	causing	them	to	defect.	The	villagers	of	Liago	expelled	Aguinaldo’s	garrison	because	it	forced	the	villagers	to	work	without	payment.	A	Filipino	officer	reporting	the	incident	claimed	that	the	townspeople	were	“out	of	patience	with	the	captains	of	the	national	militia”	for	the	“arbitrary	imprisonments	of	both	sexes…for	superfluous	services	required	without	food	being	provided	all	day”	as	recompense.126	In	this	instance,	Aguinaldo’s	fighters	lost	the	political	battle	and	the	inhabitants	bought	into	the	Army’s	narrative.		The	structure	of	the	Army’s	justice	system	was	calculated	to	preserve	order	among	the	occupied	territories	and	present	American	rule	as	a	“civilized”	alternative	to	home	rule.	Despite	the	harsh	punishments	the	provost	courts	could	impose	on	offenders,	and	the	suspension	of	constitutional	rights,	the	Army	was	trying	to	keep	alive	the	narrative	that	American	rule	would	be	beneficial	to	the	islands’	ilustrados.127	The	court	system	that	developed	during	the	years	of	the	
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and	Introduction.		Vol.	4	(Pasay	City,	Eugenio	Lopez	Foundation,	1971)	636.	126	Exhibit	No.	950,	Taylor,	John	R.M.	The	Philippine	Insurrection	Against	the	United	States,	311.	127	Paul	Kramer,	Blood	of	Government,	171.	
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Army’s	colonial	rule	was	a	way	to	showcase	American	justice	and	curtail	atrocities	among	American	troops	to	support	that	narrative.	Manila	became	the	center	of	the	islands	judiciary	system,	in	part	because	it	was	the	first	major	city	under	American	control	with	functional	courts.		The	only	other	relatively	stable	American	occupied	territory	was	the	island	of	Negros	and	a	civil	court	was	not	established	there	until	July	1899.	The	composition	of	the	civil	courts	included	both	American	officers	and	Filipino	ilustrados.	G.O.	43’s	extension	of	a	reliable	judiciary	to	the	provinces	demonstrates	that	the	Army	recognized	that	the	new	battlefield	would	become	the	provincial	towns.	In	order	for	the	military	to	successfully	create	conditions	favorable	for	civilian	rule	it	needed	to	convince	a	substantial	minority	of	the	Filipinos	that	American	rule	was	a	better	alternative	to	self-rule.	The	diversity	inherent	in	the	judicial	systems	reflects	the	broader	carrot-and-stick	policy	the	U.S.	Army	used	to	pacify	the	Philippines.	Municipal	Government		As	American	control	expanded	on	Luzon	during	1899,	conventional	Filipino	resistance	to	American	occupation	decreased.	Towns	that	were	contested	by	Filipino	forces	or	deserted	by	their	inhabitants	began	to	repopulate.	John	C.	Brown,	an	engineer	stationed	in	Central	Luzon,	wrote	in	his	diary	about	the	improving	conditions	in	occupied	towns,	describing	one	unnamed	village	that	“was	deserted	when	we	arrived”	but	now	“about	twenty	shops	have	opened…and	you	see	the	native	tailors	squatting	on	their	hams	busily	working	on	their	sewing	machines.”128	Further	indications	that	the	war	was	winding	down	was	reflected	in	dispatches	to																																																									128	Brown,	Gentleman	Soldier,	112	
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Washington.	General	Otis	reported	to	his	superiors	in	Washington	that	the	“mass	of	people…desire	peace	and	American	protection”	and	“no	longer	flee	on	approach	[of]	our	troops.”	129	The	virtual	destruction	of	Aguinaldo’s	field	army	in	the	campaigns	of	1899	combined	with	the	return	of	the	native	population	convinced	the	American	command	that	the	war	was	all	but	won	by	January	1900.130	The	Army’s	perceived	success	called	for	a	restructuring	of	the	municipal	governments,	and	in	mid	1900	it	decided	to	replace	G.O.	43.	G.O.	43	was	never	meant	to	be	a	permanent	solution	to	governing	the	Philippines,	and	a	commission	was	summoned	to	provide	both	Filipino	and	American	input	in	formulating	the	new	provincial	structure.	General	Otis	implemented	the	commission’s	recommendations	two	months	later	in	March	1900.	General	Order	40,	1900	series,	attempted	to	create	a	“decentralized	municipal	government”	where	“each	municipality	is	the	legitimate	administrator	of	the	interests	of	its	town.”131	The	decentralized	form	of	government	fell	in	line	with	President	McKinley’s	original	1898	instructions	to	the	Army.	Historian	Paul	Hutchcroft	contends	that	there	was	a	push	among	President	McKinley’s	advisors	to	create	an	imperial	form	of	government	that	reflected	American	ideals	and	move	away	from	the	system	created	by	other	colonial	powers.132		The	commission	wanted	to	create	a	“practicable	plan	of	municipal	government…which	shall	be	as	liberal	in	character	as	existing	conditions	permit.”	133	In	this	context,	the	word	“liberal”	should	be	taken	to	mean	that	the	Filipino	people	would	have	maximum	control	over	
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municipal	affairs.	At	the	dawn	of	1900,	the	Army	believed	that	the	war	had	deescalated	to	the	point	where	it	could	take	a	step	back	from	colonial	administration	and	pass	a	larger	portion	of	the	burden	to	the	Filipinos.	The	shift	to	decentralization	marked	a	definitive	change	from	the	centralized	Spanish	model	of	colonial	governance	and	a	relaxation	of	military	authority.	The	major	structural	change	G.O.	40	implemented	was	a	new	classification	system	for	the	towns	and	the	creation	of	provinces	and	provincial	governors.	Under	Spanish	rule,	the	rural	towns	were	modeled	around	the	church	or	parish	and	had	a	certain	number	of	priests	depending	on	their	size.134	Incorporated	towns	were	divided	into	four	classes	according	to	the	number	of	inhabitants.		First	class	towns	consisted	of	at	least	25,000	inhabitants	and	were	allocated	18	councilors.	Second	and	third	class	towns,	which	held	10,000-18,000	people	and	2,000-10,00	persons	respectively,	were	allotted	ten	councilors.	Towns	that	had	between	2,000	and	10,000	inhabitants	were	allotted	ten	councilors.	135		The	councilors	formed	a	governing	body	that	operated	in	the	same	manner	of	the	legislative	branch	of	a	government.	They	created	offices	of	municipal	secretary,	treasury,	attorney,	and	all	other	public	offices	that	they	deemed	pertinent	such	as	the	chief	of	the	native	police.	They	had	the	power	to	levy	taxes,	appropriate	spending,	and	enact	ordinances.	136	The	councilors	resembled	the	earlier	advisory	council	on	Negros.	They	shared	many	of	the	same	powers	and	restrictions;	both	could	enact	laws,	pass	resolutions,	and	authorize	taxes.	However,	on	Negros	the	
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advisory	council’s	actions	were	subordinate	to	the	military	governor,	who	could	veto	their	laws.	G.O.	40	gave	the	councilors	a	greater	amount	of	independence	because	they	did	not	directly	report	to	the	American	garrison	commander.	Instead	of	an	American	officer	with	veto	power,	only	the	Filipino	mayor	could	veto	laws	passed	in	town	organized	under	G.O.	40.	Executive	authority	in	the	municipalities	was	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	an	
alcalde,	who	was	essentially	the	town	mayor.	His	responsibilities	included	presiding	over	the	meetings	of	the	municipal	council,	appointing	all	non-elected	public	positions,	and	enforcing	and	approving	town	ordinances	and	laws.	The	alcade	was	also	responsible	for	collecting	taxes	and	issuing	orders	to	the	native	city	or	rural	police.	Essentially,	the	alcalde	took	on	all	the	responsibilities	of	the	executive	branch,	while	the	councilors	formed	the	legislative	branch.	137	This	system	was	very	similar	to	the	municipal	structure	Aguinaldo	organized	for	the	nationalist	government	in	1898.138		While	there	is	no	direct	evidence	that	links	the	Philippine	National	Government	and	G.O.	40,	a	respectable	number	of	Aguinaldo’s	former	high	ranking	civilian	and	military	officers	found	their	way	into	the	highest	levels	of	the	military’s	government.	In	mid	1900,	General	Arthur	MacArthur	granted	a	general	amnesty	to	any	insurgents	who	surrendered	to	the	United	States.139	Although	this	policy	had	mixed	results,	it	attracted	several	prominent	Filipino	officials.	Pantaleón	Garcíia,	Aguinaldo’s	chief	of	staff,	Pedro	Paterno,	the	former	president	of	the	Philippine	
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cabinet,	and	the	Generals	Pilar	and	Garcia,	two	of	the	insurgency’s	most	respected	commanders,	took	the	amnesty	oath	along	with	some	5,000	others.140	While	none	of	them	influenced	G.O.	40,	they	did	impact	the	political	landscape	by	encouraging	other	Filipino	nationalists	to	go	over	to	the	United	States	and	formed	the	first	Filipino	political	party	under	American	colonial	rule.	The	former	members	of	Aguinaldo’s	cabinet	formed	the	Federal	Party,	which	attained	a	measurable	effect	on	the	political	landscape	in	the	islands.	Their	platform	called	for	the	creation	of	an	American	protectorate	with	an	eventual	route	to	American	statehood.141	Although	they	were	formed	too	late	to	influence	the	development	of	G.O.	40,	and	their	aspirations	for	statehood	were	ambitious,	the	Federalists	did	convince	a	number	of	insurgents	to	defect	to	the	United	States.142	The	Federalist	Party,	combined	with	the	relatively	loose	voting	requirements	in	G.O.	40	and	the	simple	fact	that	the	United	States	was	winning	the	war,	made	American	rule	increasingly	attractive.	G.O.	40’s	voting	requirements	allowed	for	a	broader	voter	base	in	reorganized	townships.	Any	male	twenty	three	and	older	could	vote	as	long	as	they	lived	in	the	town	for	six	months	before	the	election,	paid	thirty	pesos	or	more	in	taxes,	and	could	speak,	read,	or	write	English	or	Spanish.	A	possible	reason	for	the	language	and	residency	requirements	of	eligible	voters	is	it	theoretically	restricted	pan-regional	involvement	in	local	government.	It	discouraged	political	movement																																																									140	Arthur	McArthur	to	Adjutant-General,	August	31,	1900,	Correspondence,	1203;	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	
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between	regions,	which	in	theory	prevented	outside	insurgent	leaders	from	being	elected	to	public	office.	In	some	ways	this	made	subsequent	pacification	more	difficult	because	insurgent	leaders	who	also	held	public	office	were	also	natives	of	the	region.		Compared	to	General	Order	30,	on	the	island	of	Negros,	the	voting	requirements	were	less	strict.	The	biggest	change	was	the	reduction	of	the	property	requirement	from	men	who	owned	at	least	500	American	dollars	to	men	who	only	paid	30	pesos	in	taxes.	The	reduction	of	the	property	requirement	expanded	the	general	electorate	and	represented	a	slight	and	a	shift	in	American	attempts	to	appeal	directly	to	the	
ilustrados.		A	lower	property	requirement	allowed	all	but	the	poorest	Filipinos	to	participate	in	the	American	colonial	government.	The	military	continued	to	exercise	some	control	over	the	mayors	and	town	councils	through	the	office	of	provincial	governor.	The	military	governor	of	each	district	appointed	the	provincial	governors,	and	the	provincial	governors	in	turn	had	the	ability	to	suspend	and	appoint	municipal	officials.143	While	there	was	theoretically	no	prohibition	on	Filipinos	serving	as	provincial	governors,	Europeans	tended	to	fill	those	positions.	The	first	provincial	governor	was	an	American,	H.	Phelps	Whitmarsh,	who	was	a	journalist	and	writer	prior	to	his	appointment.	In	an	interesting	side	note,	his	provincial	secretary	was	German.144	The	appointment	of	a	European	to	such	a	prominent	position	represented	the	shortage	of	qualified	American	colonial	officials.	The	shortage	made	the	incorporation	of	Filipinos	into	government	not	only	a	strategy	but	a	necessity	for	the	American	colony	to	function.																																																									143	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	“G.O.	40”	General	Orders	and	Circulars	1900,	19.	144	Williams,	The	Odyssey	of	the	Philippine	Commission,	123.	
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The	Army	did	not	intend	to	implement	G.O.	40	throughout	the	entire	Philippine	Islands.	It	was	up	to	the	district	commanders	to	decide	if	conditions	were	favorable	for	its	implementation.145	The	implementation	of	G.O.	40	reflected	the	variation	of	American	success	and	strategy	across	the	archipelago.146	G.O.	40	was	the	form	of	government	the	Army	reserved	for	the	most	pacified	regions.	An	examination	of	the	implementation	of	G.O.	40	or	the	civil	forms	of	administration	that	preceded	it	demonstrates	the	varying	levels	of	resistance	on	Luzon.	For	example,	the	Filipinos	in	the	district	of	North-West	Luzon,	commanded	by	General	Samuel	Young,	were	more	receptive	to	the	American	occupation.	By	the	beginning	of	1901,	Young	considered	the	city	of	Laoag	in	Illocos	Norte	and	the	towns	of	Candon	and	Vigan	in	Illocos	Sur	sufficiently	cooperative	to	implement	G.O.	40.147	While	these	two	towns	represent	a	small	portion	of	the	total	population	of	the	region	it	represented	significant	progress	from	the	American	perspective	because	G.O.	40	was	designed	for	territories	where	resistance	was	minimal	and	the	Army	could	take	a	step	back	from	civil	control.	General	Young	considered	the	implementation	of	civil	administration	in	his	district	a	critical	part	of	the	war	effort.	In	every	town	his	men	garrisoned,	Young	established	some	form	of	Filipino	civil	government.	At	a	minimum	these	Filipino	government	consisted	of	a	president,	or	mayor	supported	by	a	town	council	and	a	local	police	force	recruited	from	Filipinos	loyal	to	the	United	States.148		
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Where	General	Young’s	policy	differed	drastically	from	official	policy	was	in	how	tightly	he	controlled	the	civil	officials.	Garrison	commanders	were	responsible	for	reporting	civil	activities	and	compiling	profiles	on	the	Filipinos	who	served	in	public	office.	These	were	reported	directly	to	Captain	John	Balance,	the	staff	officer	who	oversaw	civil	administration	in	northwestern	Luzon.149	Balance	also	moonlighted	as	Young’s	intelligence	chief	and	was	responsible	for	compiling	data	on	insurgent	leaders	and	activists.150	Balance	drew	information	both	from	American	commanders	and	a	type	of	secret	service	known	as	the	Guardia	de	Honor,	which	was	made	up	of	former	insurgents	now	responsible	for	rooting	out	insurgent	activity	in	the	towns.151	The	Guardia’s	efforts	combined	with	the	Maccabee	scouts,	recruited	from	ethnic	minorities	as	an	auxiliary	force,	defeated	the	insurgency	in	Northern	Luzon.	Both	the	Guardia	de	Honor	and	the	Maccabees	were	examples	of	the	American	government	using	dissatisfied	Filipino	factions	to	support	their	war	effort.		Manila	considered	the	department	of	Northern	Luzon’s	Fourth	District,	commanded	by	General	Frederick	Funston,	as	a	second	region	that	was	sufficiently	stable	to	incorporate	G.O.	40.		By	beginning	of	1901	one	of	the	provinces	in	the	district,	Nueva	Ecija,	organized	no	fewer	than	six	sizeable	towns	under	the	provision	of	G.O.	40.	In	the	district’s	other	major	region,	Pampagana,	the	military	government	considered	four	towns	sufficiently	pacified	for	G.O.	40.	152	In	the	Fourth	District,	the	Army’s	success	had	less	to	do	with	a	successful	strategy	and	more	to	do	with	the	ethnic	tensions	between	the	Tagalogs	and	the																																																									149	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	33.	150	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	33.	151	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	43-44.	152	Military	Governor	of	the	Philippines,	Annual	Report	of	MG	Arthur	MacArthur	40-41.	
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majority	Ilocano	population.	153	The	ethnic	divisions	in	the	district	allowed	General	Funston	to	recruit	large	numbers	of	auxiliary	forces	from	the	loyal	Ilocanos	of	the	province.154	Native	scouts,	combined	with	the	proliferation	of	American	garrisons,	which	ranged	in	size	from	whole	regiments	to	less	than	a	company,	and	the	relative	apathy	of	the	ethnic	Ilocanos	created	an	environment	similar	to	Negros	in	1899.	By	exploiting	ethnic	tensions,	manifested	as	Ilocano	fear	of	Tagalog	domination,	Funston’s	intelligence	service	and	native	forces	broke	up	most	of	the	Philippine	Republic’s	attempts	to	create	a	substantial	guerilla	presence	in	the	region.155	By	isolating	different	Filipino	ethnicities	the	Army	created	a	governing	blueprint	where	ethnic	differences	were	exaggerated	in	order	to	secure	American	control.156	This	was	the	same	formula	used	on	Negros	that	smoothed	the	American	occupation	in	1899.	Through	the	provincial	governors,	the	commander	of	the	military	district	exercised	a	degree	of	control	that	theoretically	prevented	any	Filipino	whose	interests	were	deemed	contrary	to	the	interests	of	the	United	States	from	holding	office.	The	power	to	remove	men	from	office	would	be	used	quite	often	during	the	heyday	of	the	insurgent’s	Amigo	strategy	during	1900	and	1901,	when	the	Army	discovered	that	active	insurgent	leaders	had	somehow	been	elected	to	prominent	positions	in	the	colonial	government.																																																																																																																																					153	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	64.	154	Funston,	Memories	of	Two	Wars,	319.	155	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	68,	72.	156	Paul	Kramer,	The	Blood	of	Government,	2.	
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Filipino	Responses	to	American	Success			 The	implementation	of	Filipino-run	civil	government	on	Luzon	coincided	with	a	lull	in	the	war.	In	mid-1900	the	American	people	realized	that	General	Otis	had	severely	underestimated	the	insurgency’s	resilience	and	strength.	Some	historians	view	the	implementation	of	G.O.	40	and	other	forms	of	civil	government	as	premature	given	the	subsequent	escalation	of	Filipino	resistance.	Linn	writes	that	the	Army’s	hasty	efforts	to	establish	civil	government	in	early	1900	did	little	to	root	out	former	revolutionaries;	instead	the	Americans	often	confirmed	the	very	municipal	officials	appointed	by	the	Philippine	Republic	to	aid	and	organize	the	resistance	to	American	control.157	This	developed	into	a	rather	awkward	situation	for	the	Army;	the	Filipinos	who	were	supposed	to	cooperate	and	govern	the	towns	were	the	same	people	who	were	intent	on	derailing	the	American	experiment.		 During	the	heavy	guerilla	fighting	of	1900	and	1901,	the	main	insurgent	strategy	was	to	get	their	own	people	elected	to	the	top	government	positions	in	American-held	towns.	The	historian	Reynaldo	Ileto	calls	this	strategy	amigo	warfare.	158	The	conditions	that	characterized	amigo	warfare	were	confusing	and	frustrating	for	American	troops.	American	soldiers	could	not	determine	who	were	friendly	or	enemy	in	the	pacified	towns.	159	In	regions	with	heavy	American	support,	such	as	in	Funston’s	fourth	district,	the	Army	was	able	to	construct	a	loyal	native	police	and	intelligence	network	that	kept	the	predominantly	Tagalog	insurgents	out	
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of	elected	office.	However,	in	many	instances	the	“Americans	could	not	be	certain	that	the	friendly,	cooperative…local	mayor	they	were	dealing	with	in	the	daytime	was	not	the	chairman	of	the	town’s	revolutionary	committee	at	night.”	160	The	elected	positions	became	a	new	battleground	between	the	insurgents	and	the	Americans.	For	the	Americans,	Filipino	cooperation	was	no	longer	a	simple	tactic	or	an	indication	of	success;	it	opened	up	additional	methods	of	resistance.		 The	most	infamous	amigo	case	was	discovered	quite	by	accident	in	the	town	of	Tiong	in	south	central	Luzon	in	1901.	In	May	of	that	year,	Tiong	had	been	organized	under	the	provision	of	G.O.	40	at	the	request	of	the	local	ilustrados.161	The	request	had	been	granted	and	the	town	would	have	been	a	simple	blip	on	the	radar	of	American	authorities	if	an	investigation,	whose	original	intent	was	to	investigate	American	abuse	of	natives,	had	not	revealed	that	the	insurgency	was	operating	a	highly	effective	shadow	government.162Pedro	Cantos,	the	mayor	of	Tiong,	was	in	reality	a	member	of	the	Filipino	resistance.	More	embarrassing	for	the	United	States	was	that	Tiong’s	garrison	commander	was	extremely	close	to	Cantos,	and	through	their	relationship,	Cantos	played	an	active	hand	in	shaping	local	American	policy	to	benefit	the	insurgency.163		Cantios	appointed	insurgent	leaders	to	all	the	municipal	offices	in	Tiong.	For	example,	a	Filipino	colonel	sympathetic	to	the	resistance	organized	the	native	police	force	and	falsified	reports	to	American	troops.	The	insurgents	were	even	able	to	institute	a	system	of	taxation	where	they	collected	half	the	profits	from	goods	sold																																																									160	Leto,	“The	Philippine-American	War”	in	Vestiges	of	War,	7.	161	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun,	280.	162	Sexton,	Soldiers	in	the	Sun,	279.	163	Leto,	“The	Philippine-American	War”	in	Vestiges	of	War,	9.	
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to	the	Americans,	10	percent	of	all	agricultural	production,	and	tolled	the	roads	into	Tiong.		Natives	who	drew	an	American	salary	or	worked	for	the	American	colonial	bureaucracy	also	contributed	large	portions	of	their	pay	to	the	insurgent	government.164		This	incident	demonstrates	G.O.	40’s	vulnerability	when	there	were	no	collaborating	Filipinos	in	a	town.		Tiong-type	incidents	proliferated	throughout	southern	Luzon	and	in	sections	of	the	Visayans.	Captured	insurgents	testified	during	interrogations	that	they	would	“intervene	in	the	elections	for	the	authorities	of	the	towns”	so	“those	who	knew	best	how	to”	fool	the	Americans	would	get	elected	to	office.165	For	the	insurgents,	this	type	of	shadow	government	was	the	only	way	to	support	their	continued	resistance.	The	United	States	was	too	strong	for	them	to	fight	directly	in	the	field	so	they	relied	on	a	campaign	of	misinformation	and	ambushes	to	maintain	their	independence	movement.	Without	the	active	support	of	the	towns’	inhabitants	the	insurgency’s	shadow	governments	could	not	survive.166	When	confronted	by	the	amigo	policy,	American	officers	often	were	at	a	loss	and	unable	to	differentiate	between	friendly	and	pseudo-friendly	Filipinos.	The	frustration	with	what	the	Americans	termed	“uncivilized”	Filipino	tactics	became	a	cause	of	American-instigated	torture	during	the	conflict	because	soldiers	could	not	tell	if	the	friendly	shopkeeper	or	mayor	was	the	same	man	who	was	taking	pot	shots	
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at	them	at	night.	Indeed	the	majority	of	American	defeats	in	the	later	half	of	the	war,	such	as	the	massacre	on	Samar	where	an	American	company	was	killed	nearly	to	a	man,	stemmed	from	the	ineffectiveness	of	local	commanders	to	determine	the	degree	of	hostility	of	their	native	hosts.167	The	inability	of	the	Americans	to	counter	the	amigo	policy,	especially	in	southern	Luzon,	led	to	the	revocation	of	G.O.	40	and	all	civil	government	in	the	heavily	impacted	areas.	Instead	the	United	States	embarked	on	an	aggressive	campaign	of	population	control	that	resulted	in	the	forcible	confinement	of	entire	towns	and	cities	into	enclosed	areas.		 Historian	William	Sexton	sees	the	implementation	of	the	concentration	policy	in	southern	Luzon	as	a	direct	result	of	the	Army’s	inability	to	counter	amigo	warfare.168	It	is	certainly	true	that	incidents	such	as	the	one	at	Tiong	demonstrated	the	necessity	of	the	concentration	policy	in	American	officials	eyes.	However,	instead	of	stemming	from	an	isolated	incident,	the	camps	were	the	culmination	of	the	gradually	escalating	American	response	to	irregular	warfare.	Beginning	in	1900	the	Army	sought	to	separate	the	civilian	population	from	guerrillas	by	destroying	crops,	requiring	passes,	restricting	trade	and	travel,	and	harassing	known	insurgent	sympathizers.	169	General	Arthur	MacArthur	eventually	ordered	his	men	to	concentrate	less	on	seeking	out	Filipino	resistance	forces	and	to	target	and	destroy	their	supply	routes.	170	The	Army	applied	this	policy	where	it	considered	it	appropriate	throughout	the	entire	archipelago.	Eventually	this	policy	was	
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abandoned	in	1901	except	in	southern	Luzon,	and	later	on	Samar	and	Bohol,	after	a	renewed	outbreak	of	resistance.		 Unlike	the	rest	of	Luzon,	the	insurgency	remained	strong	in	southern	Luzon	after	1900.	In	the	Camarines,	the	Filipino	revolutionary	leadership	removed	the	civilians	into	the	mountains	away	from	American	control	and	kept	them	out	of	the	towns	and	cities	with	a	mixture	of	patriotism,	propaganda,	and	intimidation.	171		The	result	was	catastrophic	to	the	Army’s	municipal	administration.	According	to	Brian	Linn,	“The	mass	evacuation	of	the	towns	had	rendered	futile	the	standard	model	of	government	under	G.O.	43”	or	its	replacement,	G.O.	40.	172	By	separating	the	population	from	the	occupiers	the	insurgents	were	unable	to	establish	shadow	governments	and	had	no	base	of	support	in	the	cities.	However,	American	strategy	of	presenting	American	rule	as	a	more	attractive	and	prosperous	alternative	to	Filipino	self-rule	was	effectively	countered	because	there	was	no	one	to	rule	over.	General	Bell,	who	assumed	command	of	the	department	of	southern	Luzon	in	1901,	authorized	his	commanders	to	concentrate	the	Filipinos	into	camps.		This	was	a	direct	response	to	the	Filipino	policy	of	removing	either	the	populace	from	the	towns	or	installing	their	own	people	in	positions	of	authority.	The	Army	believed	that	the	insurgency	was	only	able	to	continue	its	resistance	through	the	“connivance	and	knowledge	of	practically	all	the	inhabitants…who…professed	friendship	towards	the	United	States.”	173	Under	Bell’s	orders,	all	livestock,	food,	or	people	outside	of	the	concentrated	zones	were	fair	game	for	American	soldiers	and																																																									171	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	101,	104.	172	Linn,	The	U.S.	Army	and	Counterinsurgency	in	the	Philippine	War,	108.	173	General	Chaffee	to	the	Adjutant	General	September	30,	1902,	Annual	Report	of	Major	General	Adna	
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considered	enemy	property	or	combatants.174	This	would	effectively	end	the	amigo	policy	in	southern	Luzon	by	depriving	the	insurgents	of	their	base	of	support	because	no	Filipinos	could	move	freely	outside	of	the	camps	without	being	fired	on.	In	General	Bell’s	camps,	thousands	of	Filipinos	died	from	malnutrition	or	disease.	Despite	the	catastrophic	toll	on	the	Filipino	people,	the	American	government	allowed	the	camps	because	of	two	factors.	The	first	factor	was	that	the	president’s	advisors	were	looking	for	an	end	to	the	war.	Pressure	was	mounting	in	the	United	States	for	an	end	to	the	conflict	and	the	Democrats	had	made	the	annexation	issue	a	central	part	of	the	1900	presidential	campaign.175	Although	he	had	won	reelection,	pressure	was	mounting	on	President	McKinley	to	bring	the	war	to	a	rapid	end.	On	July	4	President	McKinley	relieved	the	military	from	the	responsibility	of	administering	the	island’s	colonial	government	and	transferred	that	authority	to	Judge	William	Howard	Taft’s	Philippian	commission.176	The	executive	branch	needed	a	tangible	strategy	to	end	fighting	in	the	Philippines	and	was	willing	to	adopt	policies	that	promised	quick	results.	The	second	factor	was	General	Arthur	McArthur’s	replacement	in	late	1901	by	Major	General	Adna	Chaffee.	General	Chaffee	was	an	‘old	army’	Indian	fighter	who	had	just	returned	from	commanding	the	American	expeditionary	force	that	helped	to	put	down	the	Boxer	Rebellion	in	China.	Chaffee	intended	to	wage	an	“Indian-style”	campaign	in	southern	Luzon	that	was	characterized	by	the	forceful	control	of	the	population.	177	Chaffee’s	
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policy	required	that	the	“people	who	were	disposed	toward	peace	and	order	and	living	outside	military	observation	should	separate	themselves…from	[those	who]	were	not	disposed	to	peace.”	178	While	this	policy	was	ultimately	successfully	from	a	strictly	military	point	of	view,	much	of	the	southern	Tagalog	provinces	were	converted	into	a	wasteland	by	March	1902.	Food	and	livestock	that	could	not	be	moved	to	the	protected	zones	were	burned,	and	a	cholera	epidemic	broke	out	in	the	southern	provinces,	exacerbated	by	malnutrition	and	the	poor	sanitary	conditions	in	the	camps.	179		The	concentration	camps	proved	to	be	an	incongruous	end	to	the	Army’s	colonial	government.	They	were	an	implementation	of	what	General	Young	termed	“European”	methods	of	colonial	control.180	American	leaders	knew	that	the	camps	caused	significant	hardships	to	the	Filipinos	and	acknowledged	that	the	American	version	was	no	less	harsh	than	their	European	counterparts;	yet	American	leaders	stressed	that	the	camps	were	legal	under	the	laws	of	war.181		While	they	were	not	employed	universally	throughout	the	Philippine	Islands	and	were	only	used	on	Samar	and	Southern	Luzon,	camps	were	the	Army’s	final	system	of	organizing	the	Filipino	people.		The	concentration	policy	brutally	separated	the	Filipino	nationalists	from	their	cooperative,	or	not	actively	hostile	countrymen.	The	camps	presented	a	stark	contrast	to	the	earlier	policies	the	military	government	pursued	and	demonstrated	the	United	States	was	willing	to	inflict	a	great	deal	of	destruction																																																									178	General	Chaffee	to	the	Adjutant	General	September	30,	1902,	Annual	Report	of	Major	General	Adna	
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to	consolidate	their	regime.	Ultimately	the	concentration	policy	bared	the	hollowness	in	President	McKinley’s	overtures	for	peace.	The	United	States	was	willing	to	sacrifice	thousands	of	native	lives	to	enforce	their	colonial	rule.	Foundations	of	Colonial	Government		The	military’s	jurisdiction	over	civil	administration	technically	ended	when	the	Second	Filipino	Commission	assumed	control	over	civil	affairs	on	July	4,	1901.182		The	Army	transferred	twenty-two	out	of	the	seventy-seven	total	provinces	in	the	Philippines	to	Taft’s	civil	administration,	but	this	accounted	for	a	little	more	than	half	the	archipelago’s	population	.	Although	technically	under	civilian	rule,	the	military	retained	its	former	authority	over	noncompliant	provinces	in	the	Philippines.	On	average,	these	provinces	were	geographically	isolated	and	less	populous	than	their	pacified	counterparts.183	Even	after	the	official	transfer	to	civilian	control	the	Army	retained	a	sizeable	presence.		 The	Taft	commission	established	the	first	true	civil	colonial	government	in	the	American	occupied	Philippines.	The	civil	government	adopted	many	of	the	same	tactics	to	maintain	American	rule	that	the	Army	used	to	impose	it.	Native	scouts,	such	as	the	Maccabees,	became	the	foundation	of	the	infamous	Filipino	constabulary,	who	were	responsible	for	preserving	American	authority.	Armed	with	the	suspension	of	habeus	corpus	and	other	war-time	strategies	such	as	General	Bell’s	resettlement	or	“concentration”	camp	policy,	the	constabulary	suppressed	major	challenges	to	American	authority	on	Luzon	in	1905,	Cebu	in	1906,	and	Moros	
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in	1913	to	name	but	a	few	instances.184	The	twin	aspects	of	force	and	political	incorporation	continued	to	preserve	American	rule	in	the	islands	just	as	it	implemented	it.	Just	as	the	military	government	had	done,	Taft	structured	voting	restrictions	and	colonial	policy	to	favor	the	Filipino	elite,	which	combined	with	the	military’s	efforts	to	maximize	Filipino	participation.	Parallels	between	the	voting	restrictions	the	commission	laid	out	and	General	Order	40	persisted	as	the	Philippine	Commission	assumed	power.	Like	in	G.O.	40,	voting	was	restricted	to	males	at	least	twenty-three	years	of	age	who	could	read	or	write	English	or	Spanish.		Some	changes	Taft’s	government	made,	such	as	raising	the	voting	property	requirement	to	500	pesos,	served	to	entrench	power	in	the	hands	of	wealthy	Filipinos.	185	This	allowed	the	
ilustrados	to	dominate	the	emerging	government.	186	The	ilustrados	formed	political	parties	that	pursued	a	cooperative	relationship	with	the	United	States.	In	exchange	for	their	cooperation	and	peace	in	the	Philippines,	the	American	government	enacted	policies	that	preserved	the	Filipino’s	elite’s	socio-economic	status.187That	implicit	agreement	was	the	very	thing	the	Army’s	haphazardly	formed	colonial	government	attempted	to	cultivate.	The	civil	governors	kept	the	municipal	structure	in	the	Philippines	nearly	identical	to	the	system	the	Army	developed.	Like	G.O.	40,	the	“municipal	code	made																																																									184	Michael	Cullinane,	“Bringing	in	the	Brigands:	The	Politics	of	Pacification	in	the	Colonial	Philippines,	1902-1907”	Philippine	Studies,	57,	no	1	(2009):	51,	57-58;	Joshua	Gedacht,	“Mohammedan	Religion	Made	it	Necessary	to	Fire:	Massacres	on	the	American	Imperil	Frontier	from	South	Dakota	to	the	Southern	Philippines”	in	Colonial	Crucible,	397.	185	Williams,	The	Odyssey	of	the	Philippine	Commission,	140.	186	Stuart	Miller,	Benevolent	Assimilation:	The	American	Conquest	of	the	Philippines,	1899-1903	(New	haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1982),	263.	187	Michael	Cullinane,	“Bringing	in	the	Brigands,”	69.	
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the	government	of	the	towns	practically	autonomous”	by	colonial	standards,	according	to	one	of	Taft’s	undersecretaries.	188	The	entire	structure	served	to	entrench	the	rural	power	structures	dominated	by	wealthy	Filipinos.189	Along	the	same	vein,	the	commission	kept	the	emerging	legal	system	the	Army	pioneered	in	1899.	A	review	of	the	Spanish	legal	system	found	it	“so	cumbersome	and	so	opposed	to	modern	conceptions	of	justice”	that	the	Army’s	legal	system	was	initially	adopted	unadulterated	by	the	civilian	administration.	190	This	in	turn	kept	the	preexisting	power	structures	in	the	cities.	Much	like	the	Army’s	administration,	the	upper	class	Filipinos	cooperated	with	the	colonial	administration	and	could	be	found	working	at	every	level	of	government.	The	Army’s	policy	toward	Filipino	self-rule	was	set	in	the	storyline	the	McKinley	Administration	sold	to	the	public.	Both	government	officials	and	private	citizens	stated	that	the	United	States	needed	to	annex	the	Philippine	Islands	not	only	to	benefit	from	its	resources,	but	also	to	coach	the	natives	along	the	path	to	“self	sufficient”	rule.	What	“self	sufficient”	entailed	was	never	formally	defined	and	was	instead	held	as	a	loose	promise	to	the	Filipino	people	as	a	potential	reward	for	cooperation.	When	testifying	before	a	senate	subcommittee	then	Governor	Taft	advocated	postponing	a	clear	definition	of	American-Philippine	relations	to	some	unspecified	time	in	the	future.	When	several	senators	described	situations	where	the	Philippines	might	achieve	statehood	or	become	a	dependency	like	Canada	or	Australia	was	to	the	United	Kingdom,	Taft	refused	to	condone	their	visions.	The	only	
																																																								188	Williams,	The	Odyssey	of	the	Philippine	Commission,	140.	189	Paul	Kramer,	Blood	of	Government,	173.	190	Williams,	The	Odyssey	of	the	Philippine	Commission,	92.	
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concrete	policy	goal	he	suggested	was	to	not	define	the	relationship	and	maintain	all	options	as	future	possibilities.191It	is	entirely	possible	that	the	idea	of	“self	sufficiently”	was	a	talking	point	to	encourage	support	for	annexation	among	anti-imperialists	and	the	Filipino	people.	192		Despite	the	official	silence,	the	people	responsible	for	constructing	the	American	colonial	government	transported	aspects	of	American	government,	such	as	the	separation	of	powers	and	representative	democracy,	in	a	limited	form	with	them	across	the	Pacific.		As	one	astute	governor	of	the	Philippines	noted,	Americans	“were	convinced	that	we	had	the	best	form	of	government	ever	devised	in	the	world	and	that	our	customs	and	habits”	were	the	“mark	of	civilization.”193		The	Army	developed	the	provisions	in	the	legal	code,	the	government	structures	on	Negros,	and	the	provisions	of	G.O.	43	and	40	with	vague	instructions	from	America’s	policy	makers.	The	Army	created	a	system	of	colonial	government	that	allowed	the	Filipino	collaborators	a	significant	amount	of	discretion	in	governing	themselves	in	the	American	colony.	In	areas	where	the	Filipino	people	refused	to	cooperate,	the	United	States	cemented	its	rule	with	force.	The	Army	developed	a	uniquely	American	form	of	colonial	government	that	both	enfranchised	and	repressed	the	Filipino	people.	The	military	government	in	the	Philippines	embarked	on	a	major	effort	to	conquer	the	islands	through	both	political	and	military	measures.	The	combination	of	the	two	created	a	new	template	for	American	colonial																																																									191	Henry	Graff,	ed.	American	Imperialism	and	the	Philippine	Insurrection:	Testimony	Taken	from	
Hearings	on	Affairs	in	the	Philippine	Islands	before	the	Senate	Committee	on	the	Philippines-1902	(Boston:	Little	Brown	and	Company,	1969),	38.	192	Grunder,	&	Livezey,	The	Philippines	and	the	United	States	69,	193	Theodore	Roosevelt	JR,	Colonial	Policies	of	the	United	States	(New	York:	Doubleday,	Doran	&	Company,	1937),	85.	
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governance	that	formed	the	foundation	of	the	succeeding	colonial	state	in	the	Philippines.																																			 						
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